“The GENIUS Act is law and the CLARITY Act is not. GENIUS § 4(a)(11) bars the issuer from paying yield solely for holding a payment stablecoin; the Tillis-Alsobrooks compromise in the Senate Banking Committee's reported text of H.R. 3633 would add a separate limit on the exchanges and wallets that distribute the coin, with a carveout for bona fide activity-based rewards, a 90-day good-faith cure, and penalties of up to $5 million per violation.”
Key Takeaways
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GENIUS is the enacted floor: its statutory requirements take effect under § 20 on the earlier of January 18, 2027 or 120 days after final implementing rules; the OCC’s final rule published October 23, 2026, so January 18, 2027 is the earlier date. From then, issuing a payment stablecoin in the United States without PPSI status is unlawful, and the regulator’s waiver reaches only an applicant whose application is already pending.123
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The agencies are not yet aligned on rewards paid through third parties: the OCC’s final rule replaced its proposed presumption with a substance test; the FDIC, NCUA, and Federal Reserve proposals, all issued before it, still carry a presumption, each for the issuers that agency supervises.2456
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Tillis-Alsobrooks would bar exchanges and wallets, not issuers, from paying deposit-equivalent yield: it preserves bona fide activity rewards, gives a good-faith 90-day cure, bans representations that rewards come from the coin or are deposit-like, and carries penalties of up to $5 million per violation; a one-year joint SEC, CFTC, and Treasury rulemaking draws the line.7
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The bill is stalled: the Senate failed to invoke cloture 49-50 on September 15, 2026, and the 119th Congress ends January 3, 2027.8
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Three archetypes sort the products: pure payment stablecoin, payment stablecoin plus a rewards program, and wrapped yield-bearing instrument, the last likely an SEC-regulated security.
Where to start. Issuers: Sections II, IV, and IX. Exchanges and wallets: Sections III, V, and X. Banks and bank-affiliated groups: Sections VI and VII. Anyone tracking the bill: Section VIII. Each section opens with its bottom line.
I. Bill Stalled: The Tillis-Alsobrooks Compromise Sits in a Senate Banking Reported Substitute That Hasn’t Been Reconciled
Bottom line: GENIUS is law and takes effect January 18, 2027; CLARITY, which carries the Tillis-Alsobrooks rewards limit, is stalled in the Senate and must start over if it is not enacted by January 3, 2027.
The GENIUS Act is law. The 2021 stablecoin report of the President’s Working Group, the FDIC, and the OCC had recommended that Congress require issuers to be insured depository institutions.9 Congress chose differently: the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins (GENIUS) Act, Pub. L. No. 119-27, enacted July 18, 2025, built a dual-track Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer (“PPSI”) framework with federal and state pathways.10 Under § 20 it takes effect on the earlier of January 18, 2027 or 120 days after the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators issue final implementing rules. The OCC published the first such final rule on October 23, 2026, so January 18, 2027 is the effective date; the FDIC, NCUA, Federal Reserve, and FinCEN/OFAC rules remain proposals.12
The CLARITY Act is not law. The Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025, H.R. 3633, passed the House on July 17, 2025.11 The Senate Banking Committee released the Tillis-Alsobrooks stablecoin-yield text on May 1, 2026 and advanced its substitute 15-9 on May 14, 2026; the provision sits at § 404 of the text the committee reported on June 1, 2026 (Calendar No. 423).12 That text has not been reconciled with the House bill or with Senate Agriculture’s parallel bill. Majority Leader Thune filed cloture on August 8, 2026.13 On September 15, 2026 the Senate voted 49-50 against invoking cloture on the motion to proceed; Senators Collins, Hawley, Moran, and Tillis voted no, Senator Tillis so that he could enter a motion to reconsider. The Senate did not proceed to the bill that day.8 The disputes reported before the vote were the illicit-finance provisions, stablecoin yield and rewards, and the government-ethics provisions on the President’s crypto holdings; if the Senate passes the bill, it returns to the House for another vote.13 The 119th Congress ends January 3, 2027, and a bill not enacted by then must be reintroduced.
H.R. 3633’s House-passed Section 404 governs CFTC registration of digital commodity exchanges, a different provision from the Senate Banking yield compromise that shares its number. I refer to the Senate Banking provision as “Senate Banking § 404” or “the Tillis-Alsobrooks compromise” throughout.
This article is the dual-framework roadmap. GENIUS Act PPSI compliance is the enacted floor, effective January 18, 2027. Senate Banking § 404 is a limit on rewards paid at the exchange and wallet layer that may or may not become law. Stablecoin issuers building rewards programs need an architecture that works under GENIUS alone and under GENIUS plus § 404. The frame I use throughout is “the Three Archetypes”: Pure Payment Stablecoin (PPS), Payment Stablecoin plus Rewards Program (PS+R), and Wrapped Yield-Bearing Instrument (WYBI). These are analytical labels, not statutory categories, and the second names a coin and a separate program, not a coin that pays rewards.
II. The Three-Layer Stack: GENIUS Issuer-Level Prohibition, Agency Implementation, CLARITY Statutory Overlay
Bottom line: three layers govern stablecoin rewards: GENIUS’s issuer-level ban, each banking agency’s treatment of payments routed through affiliates and third parties, and, if enacted, § 404’s limit on exchanges and wallets.
A common shorthand frames this as a two-layer problem: GENIUS as the yield-silent floor, CLARITY § 404 as the sole yield overlay. In my view that framing is materially incomplete. GENIUS prohibits issuer-direct yield from January 18, 2027. The live controversy is what happens at the exchange-intermediary tier, where Circle pays Coinbase a share of reserve income scaled to the USDC held on Coinbase’s platform—$907.9 million in 2024, and half of the profits from the reserve interest under the parties’ agreement as the Consumer Federation of America describes it—and Coinbase pays “rewards” for holding USDC there: 3.85% when Reiners wrote in December 2025, and 3.75% in October 2026, for members of its paid Coinbase One tier only.141516 Whether that arrangement evades GENIUS or violates it is a question the agencies have not answered alike: the OCC proposed a rebuttable presumption for payments through affiliates and certain related third parties and then, in its final rule, replaced it with case-by-case review of substance; the FDIC, the NCUA, and the Federal Reserve, whose proposals all predate the OCC’s final rule, proposed the same presumption for the issuers each supervises.172456 The correct frame is a three-layer stack.
Layer 1—GENIUS § 4(a)(11) issuer-level prohibition (the statutory floor). GENIUS § 4(a)(11) prohibits “any form of interest or yield … solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention” of a payment stablecoin paid by the issuer or a foreign payment stablecoin issuer.18 From January 18, 2027, an issuer that pays a holder interest or yield solely for holding, using, or retaining the stablecoin violates the statute, and the OCC’s final rule treats payments by the issuer’s agent on its behalf the same way.12 The question is reach, not existence.
Layer 2—the agencies’ treatment of third-party arrangements (the regulatory layer). The OCC’s March 2, 2026 proposal would have presumed that an issuer pays prohibited yield where it pays interest or yield to “an affiliate or a related third party” that in turn pays holders.17 The OCC’s final rule, published October 23, 2026 and effective January 18, 2027, eliminated the presumption, which it found “could have been both overinclusive and underinclusive,” and kept a substance test: where an issuer “pays interest or yield only nominally for another purpose in an attempt to evade the statute, the OCC will look to the substance of the transaction.” It says “solely” is “best read under its plain terms to exclude payments made in connection with reasons other than holding, using, or retaining a payment stablecoin,” says “payments for bona fide services generally would not be prohibited,” and defines a holder as “the beneficial owner of a payment stablecoin.” It also cuts the other way: payments “made by an agent of the permitted payment stablecoin issuer” on its behalf are within the prohibition, the OCC “retains its authority to address evasion,” and it “declines to presume that rewards programs that predated the GENIUS Act comply.”2 The other banking agencies proposed before the OCC finalized, and each proposal carries the presumption for the issuers that agency supervises: the FDIC’s April 2026 proposal tracks the OCC’s proposal, presumption included;4 the NCUA’s May 2026 proposal does the same;5 and the Federal Reserve’s September 29, 2026 framework proposal, with comments due November 30, 2026, says it “follow[s] the approach proposed by the OCC.”6 The Board’s presumption reaches only Board-supervised PPSIs, principally subsidiaries of state member banks, and the Board’s economic analysis assumes that state member banks do not issue payment stablecoins today; its “related third party” is a person “offering to pay interest or yield to payment stablecoin holders as a service” or a person under whose branding the PPSI issues, so an independent exchange running its own program on a distribution fee is not obviously within it.6 Whether the FDIC, NCUA, and Board final rules conform to the OCC’s substance test is open. One final rule and three pending proposals now treat the exchange-channel question differently, and the question is being contested in notice-and-comment.
Layer 3—CLARITY Senate Banking § 404 (the legislative layer). The Tillis-Alsobrooks provision binds a different actor: the covered party, a digital asset service provider and its affiliates, expressly not a permitted payment stablecoin issuer.7 It sits in a Senate Banking reported text that has not cleared the floor or been reconciled with the House bill, and a one-year joint SEC/CFTC/Treasury rulemaking would follow enactment. The mechanic to watch is whether a payment that clears the § 404 carveout at the exchange still fails the issuer’s regulator’s test—the OCC’s substance test, or a presumption if the FDIC, NCUA, or Board keeps one—at the issuer that funds it.
Each layer adds; none replaces. If § 404 is enacted, an issuer and its distributors will live under all three at once; until then, under the first two.
III. The Tillis-Alsobrooks Compromise: What “Economically or Functionally Equivalent” to Deposit Interest Actually Means
Bottom line: § 404 would bar exchanges and wallets from paying interest or yield solely for holding a stablecoin, or anything “economically or functionally equivalent” to deposit interest, while preserving rewards based on bona fide activities or transactions.
The Senate Banking reported substitute’s language does the work in two clauses. The prohibition bars a covered party from paying a U.S. customer interest or yield “solely in connection with the holding” of payment stablecoins, or on a balance “in a manner that is economically or functionally equivalent to the payment of interest or yield on an interest-bearing bank deposit.” The carveout preserves rewards or incentives “based on bona fide activities or bona fide transactions” that are not so equivalent, and adds that permissible rewards “may be calculated by reference to a balance, duration, tenure, or any combination of the foregoing.”7 The covered party is a digital asset service provider together with its affiliates, “excluding any permitted payment stablecoin issuer”; the issuer’s own prohibition stays in GENIUS § 4(a)(11), which nothing in § 404 is to “modify, alter, or extend.”7
The rest of § 404 matters as much as the prohibition. An anti-evasion clause lets the joint rulemaking reach circumvention. A good-faith reliance clause spares a covered party that “structures a program in good faith reliance” on the carveout from penalties if a later rulemaking or adjudication puts the program outside it, provided the party “comes into compliance within 90 days” and the violation is not substantially similar to a past one. A representations clause bars a covered party from saying that payment stablecoins are investment products or insured, or that a reward is “paid or generated by the payment stablecoin itself, a permitted payment stablecoin issuer,” or is “risk-free or comparable to interest paid on a deposit.” The disclosure rules come within a year. Treasury may impose civil penalties of up to $5,000,000 per violation on whoever “knowingly and willfully participates in a violation,” and the SEC and CFTC refer knowing and willful violations to it. A covered party is not liable “solely because an unaffiliated third party independently makes a payment,” unless it “directs or maintains significant influence over the offering.” And within two years the Federal Reserve, the OCC, the FDIC, the NCUA, and Treasury must jointly report to Congress analyzing and quantifying stablecoin adoption and its effects, the data the deposit-substitution debate below is missing.7
The “economically or functionally equivalent” disqualifier and the “balance, duration, tenure” carveout sit in tension. A reward calculated by reference to balance is, at the limit, a deposit-rate formula. The Consumer Federation of America’s title says the ban is “Not Found,” and it argues the language “codifies that all these versions of stablecoin yield are legal.”15 Six bank trade associations, the ABA, BPI, and ICBA among them, endorsed the activity-versus-interest distinction but asked that the equivalence test be widened and the balance-duration-tenure clause struck because it “appears contradictory to the initial prohibition”; BPI has argued since August 2025 that yield paid through exchanges and affiliates evades the GENIUS prohibition, pointing to a Treasury advisory-committee figure of $6.6 trillion as potential deposit outflows.1920 The committee’s slide is not an outflow estimate. It sizes the transactional deposits that could move in what the slide labels an “Illustrative Money Supply Re-Shuffle,” one that “[p]otentially generates no net change to the US money supply,” and it treats interest-bearing stablecoins as “a hypothetical design feature.”20 The Council of Economic Advisers, on the other side, published an April 2026 paper estimating that, at its baseline calibration, the yield prohibition increases bank lending by $2.1 billion at a net welfare cost of $800 million (a cost-benefit ratio of 6.6), and only $531 billion even stacking every worst-case assumption, and concludes that a prohibition “would do very little to protect bank lending.”21 The CEA paper measures aggregate lending, not the composition or stability of bank funding, so on my reading it answers only part of the deposit-substitution question. Senate Banking advanced the bill 15-9 with the language intact.12 The disagreement is real, and the carveout’s reach is the contested question.
My first-cut definitional framework. Passive yield: the holder receives a return without taking any holder-specific action, calculated solely as a function of balance and time. Activity-based: the holder must do something specific—execute a transaction, participate in governance, attest to identity verification at a higher KYC tier, supply liquidity, validate—to earn the reward. The line is doing enormous work, and Senate Banking § 404 does not define either term. The one-year joint SEC/CFTC/Treasury rulemaking is where the rule’s real shape will appear.
The enforcement backdrop is unforgiving. In re BlockFi Lending LLC is the reference point: a settled SEC order imposing a $50 million civil penalty, with a further $50 million in parallel state settlements announced the same day, for selling crypto-lending interest accounts as unregistered securities, finding the accounts securities both as notes under Reves and as investment contracts under Howey.2223 The SEC’s complaint against Celsius Network alleges that Celsius offered and sold the Earn Interest Program as securities without a registration statement, invoking the investment-contract standard.24 The Commission’s March 23, 2026 interpretation is the governing statement: “for the reasons set forth in the Staff Stablecoin Statement” of April 4, 2025, the offer and sale of “Covered Stablecoins” does not involve securities, and the interpretation “does not address stablecoins other than Covered Stablecoins,” leaving yield-bearing stablecoins outside the non-security determination rather than inside the security framework.2526 Senate Banking § 404 does not touch that question; it governs what a covered party may pay, not whether the instrument is a security.
The securities question for a rewards program is about the program, not the coin. GENIUS § 17 takes a PPSI’s payment stablecoin out of “security,” but the OCC’s final rule warns that “an arrangement where an issuer pays interest or yield solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of payment stablecoins could be a security, depending on the facts and circumstances.”272 Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), supplies the test for an arrangement structured as a note.28 Under the family-resemblance test every note is presumed to be a security, and the presumption is rebutted only by a strong resemblance, measured on four factors (the parties’ motivations, the plan of distribution, the reasonable expectations of the investing public, and the presence of another regulatory scheme), to one of the enumerated categories of non-security notes. Under the BlockFi order, investors “lend crypto assets to BlockFi in exchange for BlockFi’s promise to provide a variable monthly interest payment”;22 a rewards program funded from reserve income or exchange revenue is a different structure, but the question Reves and Howey put to it is the same: whether the holder is lending or investing for a return. Senate Banking § 404 does not answer that question; it regulates what a covered party may pay on top of it.
IV. The Three Archetypes: Pure Payment Stablecoin; Payment Stablecoin plus Rewards Program; Wrapped Yield-Bearing Instrument
Bottom line: a plain payment stablecoin carries the lightest load; a coin with a separate rewards program carries the agency and § 404 risk; and a token that passes through Treasury yield is likely a security, not a payment stablecoin.
“The Three Archetypes” is an analytical taxonomy, not a statutory classification. PPS maps to PPSI status under GENIUS; WYBI maps to Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1) and Securities Act § 2(a)(1); PS+R is a PPSI’s coin with a rewards program run beside it. The taxonomy sorts products by which compliance stack applies to them.
A. Pure Payment Stablecoin (PPS)
The PPS is the GENIUS Act PPSI baseline. No yield to holders. No rewards. Full reserve composition, 1:1 in the asset classes § 4(a)(1)(A) enumerates, principally currency and central-bank balances, demand deposits at an insured depository institution, Treasuries of 93 days or less, overnight repo, and government money-market-fund shares, with two further clauses for regulator-approved liquid federal assets and tokenized forms.29 Monthly reserve reports, examined by a registered public accounting firm and certified by the CEO and CFO.30 AML/CFT program under the FinCEN/OFAC joint NPRM. An OFAC sanctions compliance program—the first explicit statutory mandate that a particular U.S. person maintain one.31 Federal regulator (OCC, Federal Reserve, FDIC, NCUA) or state equivalent for issuers at or under the $10 billion threshold.3230 USDC, at the issuer level, is structured to sit in this archetype; the rewards paid on it are Coinbase’s, which Coinbase calls “a loyalty program funded by Coinbase,” though Reiners argues that Circle’s reserve-income payments to Coinbase are themselves “exactly what Section 4(a)(11) forbids,” which is the point of Section II.14
Compliance cost: moderate, and the floor every PPSI incurs. The issuer keeps the float income on reserves, plus transaction, custody, and ramp fees. Legislative risk: low. § 404 adds nothing to a coin whose issuer pays holders nothing; the PPS issuer’s exposure runs only through the rewards programs competitors’ coins are distributed with.
For an issuer choosing the PPS archetype: build the GENIUS PPSI compliance stack to spec, do not commercialize any rewards layer at the issuer level, and accept that revenue comes from float rather than from rewards-product premium pricing.
B. Payment Stablecoin plus Rewards Program (PS+R)
The PS+R is a PPSI’s coin with a rewards program beside it, keyed to holder activity—transaction frequency, governance participation, attestation tier, merchant adoption, liquidity provision. The reward is a feature of the program, not of the coin, and the label matters: § 404 would bar a covered party from saying a reward is “paid or generated by the payment stablecoin itself.”7 The program comes in two variants, and the law treats them differently.
Issuer-paid rewards. GENIUS § 4(a)(11) bars the issuer from paying interest or yield “solely” for holding, using, or retaining the coin.18 The OCC’s final rule reads “solely” by its plain terms: payments made for other reasons are outside the prohibition, and “payments for bona fide services generally would not be prohibited,” though the OCC will look through a payment made “only nominally for another purpose.”2 For an OCC-supervised issuer, then, an issuer-paid reward for bona fide activity is arguably permitted under the final rule. For an issuer supervised by the FDIC, the NCUA, or the Board, the pending proposals would add a presumption against payments routed through affiliates and related third parties.456 Senate Banking § 404 would not change any of this; it excludes PPSIs from “covered party.”7
Distributor-paid rewards. Today, apart from the securities laws (Section III), no federal statute specifically limits what an exchange or wallet pays its own customers on a stablecoin balance; the stablecoin-specific constraint runs through the issuer, where the issuer funds the program.21 Senate Banking § 404 would add a new prohibition at that layer—on covered parties, expressly not on permitted payment stablecoin issuers—with a carveout for bona fide activity-based and transaction-based rewards.7 It narrows the existing space rather than opening a new one. A program designed to the broadest reading of the carveout—balance-and-tenure rewards calculated like a deposit rate—collides with the deposit-equivalence test at the exchange and, where the issuer funds the program, with the issuer’s regulator at the issuer. The program survives only if the activity nexus is satisfied at the layer where the reward is paid and the issuer’s funding of it is not, in substance, interest paid for holding.
Concrete candidates. The exchange-intermediary model—Circle’s reserve-income share paid to Coinbase, and Coinbase’s “rewards” to USDC holders—is the live disputed example; yield paid on “stablecoin deposits at third-party platforms, like Coinbase” is what the debate centers on.1415 Whether Circle/Coinbase under the current arrangement survives the agencies’ substance test, the Tillis-Alsobrooks test, or both, is the question hanging over the entire archetype. Coinbase’s current program pays only members of its paid Coinbase One tier;16 under § 404 that subscription gate would be tested as a “subscription” program, which the carveout lists but which the prohibition still reaches if it is equivalent to deposit interest.7
Compliance cost: high. The full GENIUS PPSI stack, the issuer’s regulator’s treatment of third-party arrangements, and, if § 404 is enacted, each distributor’s activity-reward documentation, the representations limits, and the joint rulemaking. Design constraint: rewards must be defensibly activity-based, not de facto passive.
The risk in the joint rulemaking runs toward a narrow reading of “activity-based.” The SEC and CFTC sit downstream of the BlockFi and Celsius enforcement actions, and the Commission’s March 2026 interpretation, like the staff statement before it, declines to reach yield-bearing stablecoins.26 The counter-signals are real: Treasury is both a co-rulemaker and the penalty authority, the CEA’s April 2026 paper concludes a prohibition “would do very little to protect bank lending,” and § 404’s own sense of Congress calls activity-based rewards “critical to enabling innovation, competition, and consumer adoption.”721 In my view, an issuer designing to the broadest “balance, duration, tenure” reading of the carveout is designing to the least likely reading.
Legislative risk: the bank trade associations’ asks would narrow the carveout toward the issuer-level prohibition, though they endorse the distinction between activity rewards and interest-like payments (Section VIII).19
For an issuer choosing the PS+R archetype: design every reward category to survive the narrower text the trades seek. Document the activity nexus at the moment of accrual, not retrospectively. Keep the reward’s source and terms out of the coin’s marketing. Build the comment-period engagement into the rulemaking calendar from day one.
C. Wrapped Yield-Bearing Instrument (WYBI)
The WYBI passes through yield from underlying reserve assets—Treasury bills, repo, money-market instruments. The yield characteristic is built into the instrument, not bolted on as a rewards layer. That structural difference puts the WYBI outside the stablecoin regulatory perimeter. The instrument is a security under Securities Act § 2(a)(1), and its issuer, engaged primarily in investing in the Treasuries and repo behind it, is an investment company under Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A) unless it fits a defined exemption.3334 GENIUS § 17’s exclusion of payment stablecoins from the federal “security” definitions does not reach it: the exclusion covers only a payment stablecoin issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer, and the Act’s own definition of a payment stablecoin excludes a security, including the shares of a registered fund.27 Senate Banking § 404 does not reach the WYBI archetype. The SEC and Investment Company Act framework does, and so does GENIUS itself on the label: from January 18, 2027, “[i]t shall be unlawful to market a product in the United States as a payment stablecoin unless the product is issued pursuant to this Act,” with Treasury fines of up to $500,000 per violation for knowing and willful participation.35
The § 3(c)(7) qualified-purchaser path (BUIDL). BlackRock’s USD Institutional Digital Liquidity Fund, with roughly $2.8 billion in assets under management as of August 2026, sits under Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7), the qualified-purchaser exemption, distributed under Securities Act Rule 506(c).36 Institutional-only. No retail access. The path works for an institutional WYBI and only an institutional WYBI.
The Rule 2a-7 path (FOBXX/BENJI). Franklin Templeton’s FOBXX, branded BENJI, is a 1940 Act registered government money-market fund operated under Rule 2a-7 with $720.93 million in total net assets as of July 31, 2026.3738 This is the cleanest WYBI path for retail distribution. The instrument is a money-market fund. It is sold as one, regulated as one, reported as one. The blockchain wrapper is operational, not definitional.
The sunset path (Mountain USDM). Mountain Protocol’s USDM was Bermuda-regulated and tokenized short-term Treasury exposure. The product wound down through an Anchorage Digital acquisition, a decision Mountain Protocol attributed in part to “the evolving U.S. regulatory landscape, including upcoming stablecoin legislation.”39 USDM is the cleanest real-world evidence that “sunset” is a viable path for issuers who concluded the registration or restructuring cost was higher than the residual U.S.-facing economics.
The offshore path (Ondo USDY). Ondo USDY is limited to non-U.S. persons, structured as a tokenized note secured by short-term Treasuries and offered under Regulation S; Ondo itself calls USDY a “yieldcoin,” not a stablecoin.40
The migration question for issuers currently marketing yield-bearing tokens as stablecoins is structural. Three paths exist: register the WYBI as a security and operate within the chosen exemption framework; restructure as a PPSI-issued payment stablecoin, with any rewards paid through a separate program; or sunset U.S. customer access. Whichever path is chosen, from January 18, 2027 the product cannot be marketed in the United States “as a payment stablecoin” unless it is issued pursuant to GENIUS.35 Converting an outstanding token into another instrument that is itself a security may require Securities Act § 5 registration of the conversion, a question outside this article.41
Compliance cost: highest—registration, Rule 2a-7 structuring and reporting, qualified-purchaser verification, or the cost of restricting U.S. access. Legislative risk: independent of § 404; the WYBI’s exposure runs through the securities and Investment Company Act frameworks.
For an issuer with an existing WYBI product line: pick the registration path that fits the investor base, plan the migration to that path with explicit § 5 registration analysis for the conversion transaction, and recognize that the WYBI is not a stablecoin no matter what the marketing materials say.
V. The “Bona Fide Activities” Carveout: Payments, Transfers, Market-Making, Staking, Governance, Loyalty
Bottom line: the more a reward tracks balance and time rather than a discrete holder action, the more likely the joint rulemaking treats it as deposit-equivalent; staking and balance-calculated hybrids carry the most risk.
The one-year joint SEC/CFTC/Treasury rulemaking will publish a non-exhaustive list of permissible activity-based and transaction-based rewards, and § 404(c)(3)(A) already directs what the list must include: payments in connection with a transaction, payment, transfer, conversion, remittance, or settlement; providing liquidity for market-making, posting collateral in connection with trading, or otherwise putting assets at credit or investment risk; and the use of any product or service, including participation in governance, validation, staking, or a loyalty, promotional, subscription, or incentive program.7 The candidates this article sorts: payments (transaction-frequency rewards), transfers (peer-to-peer activity), market-making (liquidity provision), staking (protocol participation), governance (voting and proposal participation), and loyalty (merchant adoption tiers and KYC upgrades). Each category sits at a different distance from the “economically or functionally equivalent” disqualifier.
Staking is the highest-risk category even though § 404(c)(3)(A)(iii) names it expressly in the permissible list the joint rulemaking must publish, because the same subparagraph keeps every listed activity subject to the equivalence proviso, and a lock-up reward calculated on balance and tenure is where that proviso bites.7 The doctrinal line between staking as a security under Howey and staking as an activity-based reward under § 404 is thin. For a fiat-backed coin, “staking” usually means lending the coin or supplying it to a liquidity pool, which § 404(c)(3)(A)(ii) treats as “putting assets at credit or investment risk,” and which raises the program-level securities question in Section III. An issuer whose coin is distributed with a staking-based rewards program should expect the joint rulemaking to read the staking entry narrowly and should design for that reading.
The hybrid most programs will actually use is a reward calculated on balance but triggered by activity—for example, a rate on the balance paid only in months with a set number of payments. § 404(c)(3)(B) permits a reward that is permissible on its activity terms to “be calculated by reference to a balance, duration, tenure, or any combination of the foregoing,” which is exactly the clause the bank trade associations ask Congress to strike.719 A hybrid built that way survives the text as reported and fails if the trades’ amendment is adopted.
Merchant cashback is the cleanest distinguishing case. Interchange-funded cashback—the credit-card model, where the reward is paid out of merchant-side interchange revenue—is the stronger case for the carveout because the reward is consideration for the transaction rather than for the balance. Float-funded cashback—where the reward is sourced from interest earned on holder balances—is economically the holder’s balance reformulated. But § 404(c)(2)(B) applies the prohibition to any “loyalty, promotional, subscription, or incentive program” that is economically or functionally equivalent to deposit interest, and nothing in the text turns on funding source, so funding architecture is evidence, not a safe harbor, until the joint rulemaking says otherwise.7 The same product can fall on either side of the line depending on how the reward is calculated and paid.
The Reiners critique frames the exchange-intermediary question sharply: Coinbase is the legal holder of the USDC in its custodial wallets, so Circle’s reserve-income payments to Coinbase are, Reiners argues, “exactly what Section 4(a)(11) forbids.”14 The OCC’s final rule undercuts that premise: for its regulations a holder is “the beneficial owner of a payment stablecoin,” a definition meant to “distinguish persons that merely control a payment stablecoin on another’s behalf (e.g., custodians),” though the OCC still looks to substance and retains its anti-evasion authority.2 The FDIC, NCUA, and Federal Reserve proposals still carry the presumption.456 Whether the joint rulemaking imports the related-third-party framing into the § 404 carveout is the second-order question for the PS+R program designer.
VI. The Bank-Side Path: OCC Letters 1170 / 1172 / 1174 (Reaffirmed by 1183) and the WYBI’s Investment Company Act Exposure
Bottom line: an issuer’s charter decides which regulator’s rule governs its rewards, and a yield-bearing token faces the Investment Company Act whatever its charter.
A. The OCC Interpretive Letter Stack
The OCC built the bank-side crypto-asset legal infrastructure across four interpretive letters. IL 1170 (July 2020) authorized national banks to provide crypto-asset custody services.42 IL 1172 (September 2020) concluded that national banks may hold deposits serving as reserves for stablecoins backed 1:1 by a single fiat currency and associated with hosted wallets.43 IL 1174 (January 2021) authorized national banks to use distributed ledger technology and stablecoins to facilitate payments.44 IL 1183 (March 7, 2025) rescinded IL 1179’s supervisory-non-objection requirement and reaffirmed the authorities granted in 1170, 1172, and 1174.45
The bank-side stablecoin issuance path runs through a bank subsidiary supervised by the parent bank’s federal regulator. The non-bank PPSI path under GENIUS runs through the federal track, as a Federal qualified issuer approved by the OCC, or the state track, available to an issuer “with a consolidated total outstanding issuance of not more than $10,000,000,000,” above which it transitions to federal oversight within 360 days unless the federal regulator waives the transition.30 The two paths are not interchangeable. A Federal qualified non-bank issuer gets § 5(h)‘s preemption of state charter, license, and authorization-to-do-business requirements; a state-qualified issuer operates in other states under § 7(f)‘s host-State rule; and state consumer-protection law survives on both tracks.46
The bank-affiliated rewards paradox. The intuition is that bank-affiliated groups face less § 404 risk than non-bank groups because banks already know how to pay deposit interest under Reg DD. The intuition is wrong at the distribution layer. § 404 excludes every permitted payment stablecoin issuer from “covered party,” bank subsidiary or not, but sweeps in a digital asset service provider “together with all of its affiliates”; the disqualifier’s reference instrument is a bank deposit, so a bank-affiliated exchange or wallet arm paying rewards on a stablecoin balance is measured against precisely the economic relationship its affiliated bank is built to operate.7 The paradox is that the “economically or functionally equivalent” comparator pulls the bank-affiliated distributor’s product directly into the prohibition’s center of gravity.
The charter type sets the rulebook. National-bank subsidiaries operate under the OCC’s final rule; Board-supervised issuers plan against the Federal Reserve’s two September 29, 2026 proposals, open for comment until November 30, 2026; FDIC-supervised and credit-union subsidiaries plan against the FDIC and NCUA proposals.264745 State-qualified issuers at or under the $10 billion threshold operate under state regimes that must be certified “substantially similar” to the federal framework under Treasury’s April 2026 proposed principles and its interim final rule on certification procedures, effective September 30, 2026.4849 Wyoming’s Stable Token Commission, a state instrumentality, launched FRNT on August 19, 2025.50 GENIUS reaches issuance by a “person,” a term § 2(24) defines by enumerating private entity forms, so a token a State issues in its own name is arguably outside § 3(a)‘s issuer limitation; whether a Commission created as “a body politic and corporate operating as an instrumentality of the state of Wyoming” is the State or a “corporation” or “other business entity” within § 2(24) is the question an adversary would press.50 Either way, from July 18, 2028 § 3(b)(1) makes it unlawful “for a digital asset service provider to offer or sell a payment stablecoin to a person in the United States, unless the payment stablecoin is issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer,” so exchange distribution of FRNT to U.S. persons would need FRNT to fall outside the payment-stablecoin definition or within a Treasury safe harbor.51
B. The Wrapped Yield-Bearing Instrument’s 1940 Act Exposure
Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A) classifies an issuer that is, or holds itself out as being, engaged primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities as an investment company; the § 3(a)(1)(C) forty-percent test does not reach a Treasury-bill portfolio, because government securities are excluded from “investment securities.”33 The workable paths are § 3(c)(7), for qualified purchasers only (the BUIDL route), and registration as a money market fund that complies with Rule 2a-7 (the FOBXX route); § 3(c)(1)‘s hundred-holder ceiling does not fit a broadly held token.33523637
The Commission’s March 2026 interpretation, adopting the staff’s April 2025 statement, applies Howey and Reves to “Covered Stablecoins”—1:1-reserved, redeemable on demand, non-yielding—and concludes they are not securities; it “does not address stablecoins other than Covered Stablecoins.”2526 A yield-bearing token marketed as a stablecoin gets no comfort from it. Under Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), a tokenized note paying Treasury-bill yield to holders, marketed for the yield, falls on the investment side of the line,28 consistent with USDY being sold only to non-U.S. persons, BUIDL only to qualified purchasers, and FOBXX as a registered fund.403637
VII. Reserve Custody and GENIUS § 16(c): What Changes for the Custodian, Not the Issuer
Bottom line: § 16(c) bars liability and capital gross-ups on assets a bank holds in custody, which can lower custody costs, but it leaves an issuer’s own capital requirements under § 4(a)(4).
GENIUS § 16(c) is already law and takes effect with the rest of the Act on January 18, 2027. The appropriate Federal banking agency, the NCUA, and the SEC “may not require a depository institution, national bank, Federal credit union, State credit union, or trust company, or any affiliate thereof” to carry digital assets held in custody that the entity does not own as a liability, “including payment stablecoin custody or safekeeping activities,” or to hold regulatory capital against custodied digital assets and the reserves backing them, “except as necessary to mitigate against operational risks inherent in custody or safekeeping services.”531
The provision governs the custodian’s balance sheet, not the issuer’s. An issuer’s own capital comes from § 4(a)(4), which directs the regulators to issue “capital requirements applicable to permitted payment stablecoin issuers” that “are tailored to the business model and risk profile of permitted payment stablecoin issuers.”18 For an issuer, § 16(c)‘s effect is indirect: a bank holding customer stablecoins in custody no longer faces a liability gross-up on them, and a bank holding stablecoins or the reserves backing them faces no capital charge beyond operational risk, which can lower what it charges for custody.
The accounting history is narrower than it is often told. Under SAB 121, SEC staff expected SEC-reporting entities that safeguarded crypto-assets for platform users to “present a liability on [their] balance sheet” and to “recognize an asset” at the same fair value.54 The guidance reached crypto-assets held for users; it did not reach the cash and Treasury bills that make up a fiat-backed coin’s reserves. SAB 122 rescinded it on January 23, 2025, so an entity safeguarding crypto-assets now decides “whether to recognize a liability related to the risk of loss” under the loss-contingency standards.55 § 16(c) puts a parallel bar into statute for banks, credit unions, and trust companies and extends it to “payment stablecoin custody or safekeeping activities.”53 House § 310 of the CLARITY Act would have added brokers and dealers and reached custodied assets generally, but the Senate Banking reported substitute deletes it.56
GENIUS limits both what the reserves can be and who can hold them. § 4(a)(1)(A) enumerates the eligible reserve assets, and § 10(a) permits reserve custody only by a person supervised by a primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator, the SEC or the CFTC, or a state bank or credit-union supervisor.29 For a PPSI subsidiary of an insured depository institution, the primary regulator is “the appropriate Federal banking agency of such insured depository institution”: the OCC for a national bank’s subsidiary, the Board for a state member bank’s.57 Board-supervised issuers plan their custody arrangements against the Board’s proposal until it is final, and from January 18, 2027 § 16(c) applies to their bank custodians.653
VIII. How Could CLARITY Still Become Law: Three Scenarios as of October 30, 2026
Bottom line: CLARITY can still pass in the lame-duck session, return in a new Congress, or not pass at all; in each case, design the rewards program for the narrower version.
On September 15, 2026 the Senate voted 49-50 against invoking cloture on the motion to proceed to H.R. 3633, and Senator Tillis voted no in order to enter a motion to reconsider.8 As reported before the vote, the open disputes were illicit-finance and law-enforcement protections, stablecoin yield and rewards, and the ethics provisions covering the President’s crypto holdings.13 The 119th Congress ends January 3, 2027. I do not put numbers on the scenarios below; the variables are political, and a percentage would claim more precision than the record supports.
Scenario 1: lame-duck passage. The Senate takes up the motion to reconsider, invokes cloture, and passes the bill before January 3, 2027. Because the Senate text differs from the House-passed bill, it would return to the House for another vote.13 A yield deal that clears the Senate in this window is more likely to move toward the six bank trade associations’ May 8, 2026 asks than away from them: they endorsed the distinction between activity rewards and interest-like payments on balances while asking that “solely” be struck from the holding prong, that the equivalence standard become a substantial-similarity standard, and that the balance-duration-tenure clause “be removed in its entirety.”19 BPI has argued since August 2025 that exchange and affiliate channels evade the GENIUS prohibition.20
Scenario 2: a new bill in the 120th Congress. A bill not enacted by January 3, 2027 dies, and market-structure legislation would start again with reintroduction, committee action, and floor votes. The Tillis-Alsobrooks text would be a starting point for negotiation, not a baseline, and the § 404 language could come back narrower, broader, or not at all.
Scenario 3: no market-structure statute. GENIUS and the agencies’ implementing rules govern alone. The issuer-level prohibition in § 4(a)(11) applies from January 18, 2027, each issuer’s regulator decides how far it reaches into affiliate and third-party arrangements, and distributor-paid rewards remain limited mainly by the securities laws (Section III).182
The state-preemption fight runs alongside the yield fight. House § 308 would treat a digital commodity as a covered security under NSMIA while preserving state antifraud authority under Securities Act § 18(c)(1), and thirty-one state securities regulators wrote on March 12, 2026 (a thirty-second joined April 28) urging a catch-all savings clause for state antifraud enforcement.5859 GENIUS contains no provision expressly preempting state securities law, so nothing in GENIUS prevents a state securities regulator from bringing a Howey case against a rewards program.46
The strongest case for building to the broader reading (call it “Yield-Not-Banned”) deserves a fair statement. On that view, § 404 permits activity rewards broadly, the “economically or functionally equivalent” disqualifier is a narrow exception for deposit substitutes, and the 15-9 committee vote reflects real support for a meaningful carveout.12 The CEA’s April 2026 paper concludes that a yield prohibition “would do very little to protect bank lending, while forgoing the consumer benefits of competitive returns on stablecoin holdings.”21 An issuer that can restructure quickly could rationally launch under the broader reading and accept the rebuild risk.
I still recommend designing for the tighter version, for asymmetric-downside reasons rather than because the broader reading is doctrinally wrong. In two of the three scenarios a narrower rewards rule is a live outcome, and the cost of being wrong differs by direction: a product built to the broad reading that meets a narrow rule faces pulled launches, restructuring under examination, and enforcement risk in the transition, while a product built to the narrow reading that meets a broad rule gives up some reward economics for a period. There is also a policy reason on my reading: the deposit-equivalence test answers the run and disclosure risk that holders of an uninsured, rate-bearing balance bear, the risk deposit insurance and Regulation DD disclosure address for bank depositors.60 The working rule for issuer counsel: treat the Tillis-Alsobrooks carveout as a ceiling, not a floor, and keep the option to restructure at every product milestone.
IX. If This Version Becomes Law: The Three-Archetype Compliance Playbook
Bottom line: get the PPSI application pending before January 18, 2027, build the AML and sanctions programs, and treat § 404 as a planning horizon, not a deadline.
The consolidated effective-dates calendar.
| Milestone | Date | Source |
|---|---|---|
| SAB 122 effective | January 30, 2025 | SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 12255 |
| GENIUS Act enacted | July 18, 2025 | Pub. L. No. 119-2710 |
| OCC NPRM comment period close | May 1, 2026 | 91 Fed. Reg. 10,20217 |
| FinCEN/OFAC Joint NPRM comment close | June 9, 2026 | 91 Fed. Reg. 18,58231 |
| California DFAL license deadline | July 1, 2026 (passed) | Cal. Fin. Code § 3201; AB 193461 |
| Senate cloture vote on H.R. 3633 | September 15, 2026 (failed 49-50; motion to reconsider entered) | Motion to proceed filed Aug. 8, 202613; Senate Daily Press8 |
| Treasury issuance, offer, and sale NPRM comment close | October 19, 2026 | 91 Fed. Reg. 53,36862 |
| Treasury state-certification interim final rule effective | September 30, 2026 (comments due November 30, 2026) | 91 Fed. Reg. 61,68849 |
| OCC final rule published | October 23, 2026 (effective January 18, 2027) | 91 Fed. Reg. 67,0002 |
| Federal Reserve framework and application-procedures NPRMs comment close | November 30, 2026 | 91 Fed. Reg. 61,580; 91 Fed. Reg. 61,3466 |
| 119th Congress ends; H.R. 3633 dies if not enacted | January 3, 2027 | U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 1 |
| GENIUS Act effective date | Earlier of January 18, 2027 or 120 days after final implementing rules; the OCC’s final rule published October 23, 2026, so January 18, 2027 is the earlier date | GENIUS § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 5901 note1 |
| Issuance limited to PPSIs; regulators may waive for up to 12 months only for an applicant with an application pending on the effective date | January 18, 2027 | GENIUS §§ 3(a), 5(f)3 |
| Marketing a product “as a payment stablecoin” limited to products issued under GENIUS | January 18, 2027 | GENIUS § 4(e)(3)35 |
| Digital asset service providers may offer or sell “to a person in the United States” only PPSI-issued payment stablecoins, subject to the § 3(c) safe harbors and § 18 | July 18, 2028 | GENIUS § 3(b)(1)51 |
The California DFAL deadline has passed. Since July 1, 2026 a person engaging in digital financial asset business activity with or on behalf of a California resident must hold a license under Cal. Fin. Code § 3203, have a completed application submitted on or before July 1, 2026 and still pending, or be exempt under § 3103.61 The DFAL deadline carries more immediate enforcement risk than any CLARITY milestone.
Day 0 (now through the GENIUS effective date). File the PPSI application first: after January 18, 2027 only a permitted payment stablecoin issuer may issue a payment stablecoin in the United States, and the regulators’ 12-month waiver reaches only an applicant whose application is pending on that date.3 Build the GENIUS PPSI AML/CFT program to the FinCEN/OFAC joint proposed rule—four minimum elements (internal policies, procedures, and controls; an independent audit function to test the program; a designated compliance officer; an ongoing employee training program), with customer due diligence for primary-market activity, plus the five-element OFAC sanctions compliance program.31 Map reserve composition against the OCC’s final rule, the FDIC’s April 2026 proposal, and the Federal Reserve’s proposal,246 and map the issuance, offer, and sale prohibitions against Treasury’s August 2026 proposal.62 If you serve California residents, confirm DFAL status now.
The lame-duck window (through January 3, 2027). If the Senate takes up the motion to reconsider, confirm the rewards program’s structure with counsel. If the rewards paid on your coin at the exchange or wallet layer are “economically or functionally equivalent” to deposit interest, prepare the transition to an activity-based architecture or to U.S. withdrawal. Document the activity nexus for each reward category, and test the program against the trades’ asks as well as the reported text.19
Day 180-270 (post-enactment runway). Prepare for the joint SEC/CFTC/Treasury rulemaking. Build the comment-letter strategy on the activity-based definition. Watch how the OCC applies its final rule’s substance test to third-party arrangements, and whether the FDIC, NCUA, and Federal Reserve final rules keep the presumption their proposals carry.2456
Foreign issuers. § 4(a)(11) reaches a “foreign payment stablecoin issuer” directly.18 Treasury’s August 18, 2026 proposal implementing § 3 addresses when a digital asset service provider may offer a foreign issuer’s stablecoin in the United States, including that issuer’s compliance with lawful orders and any reciprocal arrangement under § 18.62 From July 18, 2028, § 3(b)(1) turns on sales “to a person in the United States”; an issuer whose coin reaches persons in the United States through a service provider is inside the framework, and one selling only outside the United States is, on the operative read, outside it.51 Offshore yield-bearing tokens marketed through U.S. exchanges raise broker-dealer and token-classification questions beyond this article.
Key risk. § 404 enacted with the trades’ amendments, which would strike “solely,” substitute a substantial-similarity test, and drop the balance-duration-tenure clause, narrowing distributor rewards beyond the issuer-level bar, which keeps “solely.”19 Key opportunity. § 404 enacted substantially as reported, the joint rulemaking respects the activity-based carveout, and PS+R programs compete with bank-deposit products under the disclosure rules § 404(e) directs.7 Build the product to survive both scenarios.
X. Architecting a Stablecoin Rewards Product That Survives Both Regimes (and Reconciliation)
Bottom line: tie each reward to a documented activity, keep the reward’s source out of the coin’s marketing, and keep the program restructurable within § 404’s 90-day cure period.
A. The Dual-Framework Compliance Map
Walk a hypothetical PS+R product, a fiat-backed coin with a rewards program run by its distributors, through the compliance map.
GENIUS layer. PPSI registration on the federal track (or state track if under the $10 billion threshold). Reserve composition under the OCC’s final rule—1:1 backing, a daily-liquidity minimum, and a 40% limit on exposure to any one counterparty—or, for FDIC-supervised issuers, the FDIC’s April 2026 proposal with its 40% cap on exposure to any one eligible financial institution, and for Board-supervised issuers the Federal Reserve’s proposal.246 Monthly reserve reports.30 AML/CFT program under the FinCEN/OFAC joint NPRM with the four-element architecture and customer due diligence, plus the stablecoin-specific OFAC program.31
Senate Banking § 404 layer (post-enactment), for every covered party that distributes the coin. Activity-based reward structure with documented activity nexus at the moment of accrual. Qualifying-activity definitions tied to discrete holder action, not to passive balance and time. Marketing reviewed against § 404(d), which bars presenting a reward as “paid or generated by the payment stablecoin itself, a permitted payment stablecoin issuer,” or as “risk-free or comparable to interest paid on a deposit,” and a 90-day remediation plan ready, since § 404(c)(5) shields a covered party that “structures a program in good faith reliance” on the permitted-reward paragraphs only if it “comes into compliance within 90 days” of an adverse determination.7 A comment strategy for the one-year joint rulemaking that engages the SEC, CFTC, and Treasury staff on the specific activity categories the product uses.
State layer. GENIUS § 5(h) preempts state charter, license, and authorization-to-do-business requirements for federal qualified PPSIs and approved bank and credit-union subsidiaries; state consumer-protection law survives under § 7(f)(4), and GENIUS contains no provision expressly preempting state securities law.46 California DFAL licensure, pending application, or exemption for anyone conducting digital financial asset business activity with California residents.61 New York DFS stablecoin guidance for any issuer that issues U.S. dollar-backed stablecoins under DFS supervision as a BitLicensee or limited purpose trust company.63
Custody layer. Bank-custody contract architecture under SAB 122, GENIUS § 16(c), and the OCC interpretive-letter stack.555342434445
Regulation DD is a useful reference for what § 404(e)‘s disclosure rules could look like. § 404(e) directs the SEC, the CFTC, and Treasury to require, within one year of enactment, clear and conspicuous plain-English disclosure of any compensation a covered party pays in connection with holding, using, or retaining a payment stablecoin, identifying who pays it and on what terms, and stating that payment stablecoins are not deposits and are not insured.7 Truth in Savings Act / Reg DD built the bank-side disclosure architecture for consumer deposit accounts, with account-opening disclosures of the annual percentage yield, advance notice of adverse changes in terms, and periodic-statement disclosures.60 The statute itself sets narrower content: the disclosure must be “presented in a clear, factual, nonpromotional, and non-misleading manner,” must “clearly identif[y] the circumstances under which such compensation can be paid,” and must “clearly identif[y] the person or persons responsible.”7 Whether the agencies go further, toward APY-style presentation, change-in-terms notice, or periodic statements, is open; an issuer engaging in the rulemaking should be ready to answer Regulation DD-style questions.
The EU MiCA conflict is the cross-border architecture problem. MiCA Articles 40 (asset-referenced tokens) and 50 (e-money tokens) prohibit issuers and crypto-asset service providers from granting interest, and paragraph 3 of each deems any benefit related to holding duration to be interest; the rules have applied since June 30, 2024.64 § 404’s calculation-by-reference clause would permit, for U.S. distributors, a duration-linked reward that MiCA treats as interest when an EU issuer or service provider grants it, so a group operating in both markets has to design each program to the regime where it runs.
B. The Reconciliation-Risk Design Pattern
Design rewards programs to survive the trades’ version of § 404, not only the reported text. Prefer transaction-volume rewards to time-weighted rewards, governance participation to balance tiers, and pro rata distribution against a defined activity metric to discretionary distributions, which invite the “economically or functionally equivalent” disqualifier.7 Document the activity nexus for each reward category before the joint rulemaking, not after an examination.
The conditional bank-side path. If § 404 is enacted in a form that leaves little room for distributor-paid rewards, the bank-side path narrows to tokenized deposits. § 404’s covered party reaches a digital asset service provider “together with all of its affiliates,” so a bank-affiliated exchange or wallet arm is inside the prohibition, and Regulation DD governs consumer deposit accounts, not payment stablecoins.760 What remains is the deposit itself: GENIUS § 16(a)(1) preserves a bank’s authority to accept deposits and issue “digital assets that represent those deposits,” and a bank can pay interest on that tokenized deposit, with the account-opening, change-in-terms, and periodic-statement disclosures Regulation DD requires where the tokenized deposit is a consumer’s deposit account; a reward paid for opening, maintaining, or increasing the balance is a “bonus” Regulation DD also requires disclosed, but a reward keyed to transaction volume fits neither its “interest” nor its “bonus” definition on their text.5360 The path is narrower than the § 404 carveout and it is a different product, but it exists. Non-bank groups without a charter cannot rely on this fallback.
C. Closing: The Three-Archetype Diagnostic
Picking the wrong archetype today can commit a stablecoin issuer to a costly restructuring. The OCC’s final rule, the FDIC, NCUA, and Federal Reserve proposals, and the FinCEN/OFAC joint proposal are already shaping issuance, whatever happens to CLARITY.
I advise stablecoin issuers and distributors on archetype fit, the registration stack, and the dual-framework compliance map. A review covers archetype fit (PPS, PS+R, or WYBI), maps the regulatory layers an issuer’s specific product line crosses, and identifies the imminent compliance events (California DFAL status, the January 18, 2027 GENIUS effective date, FDIC and Federal Reserve finalization, FinCEN/OFAC effective dates) that need attention before any CLARITY Act milestone matters. To discuss a review, contact the firm.
The cost of designing to the right archetype is measured in legal fees and product-design iteration. The cost of designing to the wrong one is measured in pulled product launches, rescission claims, and the kind of enforcement exposure BlockFi and Celsius drew: a $50 million SEC penalty plus $50 million in state settlements in BlockFi’s case, and in Celsius’s case a consented permanent injunction, with the SEC seeking civil penalties and disgorgement against its founder.65 The architectural choice is the operative variable.
XI. Conclusion: The Enacted Floor, the Contested Overlay, and the Architectural Choice
GENIUS is law and takes effect January 18, 2027. Tillis-Alsobrooks § 404 is not law, and if it becomes law in its current form it will bind the exchanges and wallets that distribute a coin, not the issuer. Every U.S.-facing stablecoin product lives inside the three-layer stack: GENIUS § 4(a)(11)‘s issuer-level prohibition; the agencies’ treatment of affiliate and third-party arrangements, now split between the OCC’s substance test and the presumption the FDIC, NCUA, and Federal Reserve have proposed; and § 404, if enacted.
GENIUS § 16(c) sits underneath all of this. From January 18, 2027 it bars the federal banking agencies, the NCUA, and the SEC from requiring a bank, credit union, or trust company custodian to book custodied digital assets as a liability or to hold capital against them and the reserves backing them beyond operational risk. It changes the custodian’s balance sheet, not the issuer’s capital, and the Senate Banking text deletes House § 310’s extension to brokers and dealers.5356
The Three Archetypes are the design taxonomy. Pure Payment Stablecoin runs under GENIUS without a yield overlay and is the most straightforward path. Payment Stablecoin plus Rewards keeps the coin plain and puts any reward in a separate program; issuer-paid rewards turn on the issuer’s regulator, now split between the OCC’s case-by-case review and the presumption the FDIC, NCUA, and Federal Reserve have proposed, and distributor-paid rewards turn on the still-contested Tillis-Alsobrooks carveout. Wrapped Yield-Bearing Instrument is, mostly, a securities-law question pretending to be a stablecoin product. Pick the archetype before the joint rulemaking lands. Architectural choice now is cheaper than architectural rebuild after.
Section 404 is the bill’s most contested provision. The six-association trades letter and the asymmetric-downside reasoning in Section VIII push the default design toward the tighter version. Issuers with the risk tolerance and the restructuring capacity to read § 404 at its natural breadth are not wrong to do so, but they are taking the higher-variance path.
The imminent compliance event is not CLARITY. It is GENIUS’s January 18, 2027 effective date, with California DFAL already past its July 1, 2026 deadline and the Federal Reserve’s comment period closing November 30, 2026. An issuer planning around CLARITY milestones alone will be late. The live floor arrives in January, the overlay is the planning horizon, and the architecture is the decision now.
Related Resources
- Stablecoin GENIUS Act Compliance Lawyer—engaging counsel on issuer licensing, reserve structure, and a rewards program that survives both regimes
This article is the third in the firm’s CLARITY Act series. See also: The CLARITY Act Exchange Registration Roadmap: A 180-Day Compliance Calendar (Article 1—for CEX GCs facing the 90-day registration cliff); The DeFi Decentralization Test Under CLARITY: A Mechanics Guide to Section 309’s Control-Surface Analysis (Article 2—for protocol teams claiming the activity exemption); SEC Innovation Exemption 2026: A Founder’s Decision Guide for the Atkins token safe-harbor framework; the SEC/CFTC token taxonomy treatment for upstream classification analysis; and the firm’s prior GENIUS Act stablecoin compliance roadmap for the pre-Tillis-Alsobrooks issuance baseline.
Notes and sources
Footnotes
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GENIUS Act § 20, 12 U.S.C. § 5901 note (“This Act, and the amendments made by this Act, shall take effect on the earlier of (1) the date that is 18 months after the date of enactment of this Act; or (2) the date that is 120 days after the date on which the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulators issue any final regulations implementing this Act.”). A Federal Register search for final rules mentioning stablecoins published since enactment, run October 29, 2026 (available at https://www.federalregister.gov/api/v1/documents.json?conditions%5Bterm%5D=stablecoin&conditions%5Btype%5D%5B%5D=RULE&conditions%5Bpublication_date%5D%5Bgte%5D=07%2F18%2F2025), returns the OCC’s final rule, 91 Fed. Reg. 67,000 (Oct. 23, 2026), and Treasury’s interim final rule on state-certification forms and procedures, 91 Fed. Reg. 61,688 (Sept. 30, 2026), and no final rule from the FDIC, the NCUA, the Federal Reserve, or FinCEN and OFAC; the other matches (the SEC and CFTC’s crypto-asset interpretation, an IRS rule on tipped occupations, a FinCEN special measure, and an OCC/FDIC supervisory rule) do not implement the Act. 120 days after October 23, 2026 is February 20, 2027, after January 18, 2027. PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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OCC Final Rule, “Implementing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act for the Issuance of Stablecoins by Entities Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,” 91 Fed. Reg. 67,000 (Oct. 23, 2026) (FR Doc. 2026-21706), effective Jan. 18, 2027; id. at 67,153 (“this final rule is the first final rule issued by a primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator implementing the Act”); id. at 67,014 (the final rule “defines payment stablecoin holder to mean the beneficial owner of a payment stablecoin” to “distinguish persons that merely control a payment stablecoin on another’s behalf (e.g., custodians)”); id. at 67,026 (“the OCC has determined to eliminate the rebuttable presumption from the final rule”); id. at 67,027 (payments “made by an agent of the permitted payment stablecoin issuer” on its behalf are within the prohibition; the OCC “retains its authority to address evasion”; the OCC “declines to presume that rewards programs that predated the GENIUS Act comply”); id. at 67,028 (“payments for bona fide services generally would not be prohibited”; “an arrangement where an issuer pays interest or yield solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention of payment stablecoins could be a security, depending on the facts and circumstances”); id. at 67,029 (“solely” is “best read under its plain terms to exclude payments made in connection with reasons other than holding, using, or retaining a payment stablecoin”; where an issuer “pays interest or yield only nominally for another purpose in an attempt to evade the statute, the OCC will look to the substance of the transaction”); id. at 67,030 (the presumption “could have been both overinclusive and underinclusive”); id. at 67,042 (final § 15.11(c) omits the proposed weekly-liquidity requirement and limits exposure to any one counterparty to 40 percent of reserve assets). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15
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GENIUS Act § 3(a), 12 U.S.C. § 5902(a), 139 Stat. 423 (“It shall be unlawful for any person other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer to issue a payment stablecoin in the United States.”); § 5(f), 139 Stat. 442 (the regulators may waive for “a period not to exceed 12 months beginning on the effective date of this Act” with respect to a subsidiary of an insured depository institution “if the insured depository institution has an application pending for the subsidiary to become a permitted payment stablecoin issuer on that effective date,” or “a Federal qualified payment stablecoin issuer with a pending application on that effective date”). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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FDIC Second NPRM, “GENIUS Act Requirements and Standards for FDIC-Supervised Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers and Insured Depository Institutions,” 91 Fed. Reg. 18,534 (Apr. 10, 2026) (tracking the OCC proposal); id. at 18,542 (proposed § 350.4(f), a 40% cap on exposure to any one eligible financial institution); id. at 18,538-39 (proposing a rebuttable presumption for payments through an affiliate or “related third party,” defined as a person offering to pay interest or yield to holders as a service or a person on whose behalf or under whose branding the PPSI issues); id. at 18,540 (Question 22, requesting comment on the presumption); comments closed June 9, 2026. See Mayer Brown, “FDIC Proposes GENIUS Act Rules: How Do They Compare to the OCC Proposal?” (Apr. 28, 2026), available at https://www.mayerbrown.com/en/insights/publications/2026/04/fdic-proposes-genius-act-rules-how-do-they-compare-to-the-occ-proposal. PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9
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NCUA NPRM, “Investments in and Licensing of Permitted Payment Stablecoins Issuers,” 91 Fed. Reg. 6,531 (Feb. 12, 2026) (licensing PPSI subsidiaries of federally insured credit unions; an Applying Issuer must apply jointly with any insured credit union parent company); comments closed Apr. 13, 2026. NCUA Supplemental NPRM, “Implementing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act for the Issuance of Stablecoins by Entities Subject to the Jurisdiction of the National Credit Union Administration,” 91 Fed. Reg. 28,956 (May 18, 2026); id. at 28,969 (“the NCUA would presume that an NCUA-Licensed PPSI is paying” interest or yield where the proposal’s affiliate or related-third-party conditions are met); comments closed July 17, 2026. PDF PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7
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Federal Reserve Board NPRM, “Implementing the Federal Reserve Board’s Responsibilities Under the GENIUS Act,” 91 Fed. Reg. 61,580 (Sept. 29, 2026) (FR Doc. 2026-19860; Docket No. R-1899, RIN 7100-AH29) (proposing regulations “with respect to Board-supervised permitted payment stablecoin issuers (PPSIs) and certain other entities that are subject to the Board’s jurisdiction”); comments due Nov. 30, 2026; id. at 61,592 (proposing “to follow the approach proposed by the OCC” and include a presumption in proposed § 247.10(c)(4)(i)); id. at 61,650 (“insured State member banks do not issue payment stablecoins directly or through a subsidiary given the lack of regulatory clarity and the high barriers to entry”); id. at 61,670 (proposed § 247.10(c)(4)(ii), defining “related third party” as “(A) a person offering to pay interest or yield to payment stablecoin holders as a service; and (B) any person that the Board-supervised PPSI issues payment stablecoins on the person’s behalf or under the person’s branding”); Federal Reserve Board NPRM, “Application Procedures for Board-Supervised Insured Depository Institutions Seeking Approval for a Subsidiary To Issue Payment Stablecoins,” 91 Fed. Reg. 61,346 (Sept. 29, 2026); comments due Nov. 30, 2026. Before that proposal, the Board was a signatory, under its own docket (R-1885, RIN 7100-AH18), to the five-agency joint proposed rule on permitted payment stablecoin issuer customer identification programs, 91 Fed. Reg. 37,234 (June 22, 2026), which proposes text for FinCEN’s 31 C.F.R. part 1033; and its July 9, 2026 proposal on AML/CFT programs for Board-supervised banks, 91 Fed. Reg. 42,363, 42,364 n.9, states that the GENIUS Act’s AML/CFT standards for PPSIs “will be addressed separately from this rulemaking.” See also Morgan Lewis, “GENIUS Act Implementation: Key Proposals and What Comes Next” (Apr. 2026) (surveying the six proposals to that date, before the Board had issued one), available at https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/2026/04/genius-act-implementation-key-proposals-and-what-comes-next. PDF PDF PDF PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12
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H.R. 3633, 119th Cong. (as reported in the Senate, June 1, 2026) (Calendar No. 423), § 404(a)(4) (defining “covered party” as any digital asset service provider together with its affiliates, “excluding any permitted payment stablecoin issuer or foreign payment stablecoin issuer registered with the Comptroller”), § 404(c)(1) (prohibition), § 404(c)(2) (activity-based and transaction-based rewards permitted; (c)(2)(B) applying the prohibition to deposit-equivalent loyalty, promotional, subscription, or incentive programs), § 404(c)(3)(A) (joint SEC, CFTC, and Treasury rulemaking “[n]ot later than 1 year after the date of enactment,” including a non-exhaustive list of permissible rewards), § 404(c)(3)(B) (permissible rewards “may be calculated by reference to a balance, duration, tenure, or any combination of the foregoing”), § 404(b)(2) (sense of Congress that permitted rewards are “critical to enabling innovation, competition, and consumer adoption”), § 404(c)(4) (evasion), § 404(c)(5) (a covered party “that structures a program in good faith reliance on paragraphs (2) and (3) shall not be subject to penalties” if it “comes into compliance within 90 days” of an adverse determination and the violation “is not substantially similar to a past violation”), § 404(d)(1) (prohibited representations, including that a reward is “paid or generated by the payment stablecoin itself, a permitted payment stablecoin issuer,” or is “risk-free or comparable to interest paid on a deposit”), § 404(e) (disclosure rulemaking; disclosure “presented in a clear, factual, nonpromotional, and non-misleading manner” that “clearly identifies the circumstances under which such compensation can be paid” and “the person or persons responsible”), § 404(f)(1) (civil penalties “not more than $5,000,000 for each such violation”), § 404(g) (SEC or CFTC referral to the Secretary of the Treasury of knowing and willful violations), § 404(h) (joint report by the Board, the OCC, the FDIC, the NCUA, and Treasury within 2 years), § 404(i) (no deeming), § 404(k)(1) (nothing in the section shall “modify, alter, or extend prohibitions on the payment of yield, interest, or consideration applicable to permitted payment stablecoin issuers or foreign payment stablecoin issuers, including under section 4(a)(11) of the GENIUS Act”), available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BILLS-119hr3633rs/html/BILLS-119hr3633rs.htm. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6 ↩7 ↩8 ↩9 ↩10 ↩11 ↩12 ↩13 ↩14 ↩15 ↩16 ↩17 ↩18 ↩19 ↩20 ↩21
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U.S. Senate Daily Press, “Tuesday, September 15, 2026” (“By a vote of 49-50, the Senate did not agree to the motion to invoke cloture on the motion to proceed to H.R.3633”; “Senator Tillis made a motion to reconsider”), available at https://www.dailypress.senate.gov/tuesday-september-15-2026/. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, FDIC, and OCC, Report on Stablecoins (Nov. 1, 2021) (recommending Congress require stablecoin issuers to be IDIs); announced by Treasury press release available at https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0454. PDF ↩
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GENIUS Act, Pub. L. No. 119-27, 139 Stat. 419 (2025) (Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer framework; reserve composition requirements). See generally White House, “Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Signs GENIUS Act into Law” (July 18, 2025), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2025/07/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-signs-genius-act-into-law/; Latham & Watkins, “The GENIUS Act of 2025: Stablecoin Legislation Adopted in the US” (July 24, 2025), available at https://www.lw.com/en/insights/the-genius-act-of-2025-stablecoin-legislation-adopted-in-the-us. PDF ↩ ↩2
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H.R. 3633, Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025, 119th Cong. (as passed by the House, July 17, 2025), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/119th-congress/house-bill/3633/text. H.R. 3633 § 404 governs registration of digital commodity exchanges (a CFTC Title IV provision) and is distinct from § 404 of the Senate Banking reported text (Calendar No. 423). PDF ↩
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H.R. 3633, 119th Cong. § 404 (as reported in the Senate by the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, June 1, 2026) (Calendar No. 423) (reported “with an amendment” striking all after the enacting clause). The reported § 404 tracks § 404 of the amendment in the nature of a substitute “intended to be proposed by Mr. SCOTT of South Carolina” (EHF26374), with its definitions renumbered and conforming wording changes. The committee’s earlier substitute text (EHF26031), whose § 404 carried an earlier rewards provision without the equivalence test, is available at https://www.banking.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/market_structure_draft.pdf. See Jesse Hamilton, “Clarity Act Clears U.S. Senate Committee, on Its Way to a Final Test in Congress,” CoinDesk (May 14, 2026) (15-9 vote), available at https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2026/05/14/clarity-act-clears-u-s-senate-committee-on-its-way-to-a-final-test-in-congress; Nikhilesh De & Jesse Hamilton, “Clarity Act Text Lets Crypto Firms Offer Stablecoin Rewards While Shielding Bank Yield,” CoinDesk (May 1, 2026) (text released May 1, 2026; compromise negotiated by Senators Tillis and Alsobrooks), available at https://www.coindesk.com/policy/2026/05/01/clarity-act-text-lets-crypto-firms-offer-stablecoin-rewards-while-shielding-bank-yield. PDF PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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“Senate Keeps Clarity Act Alive With Crypto Bill Vote Set for September,” Decrypt (Aug. 8, 2026) (Senate Majority Leader Thune filed the motion to proceed and cloture on H.R. 3633; first procedural vote set for September 15, 2026), available at https://decrypt.co/375174/senate-keeps-clarity-act-alive-with-crypto-bill-vote-set-for-september. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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Lee Reiners, “Circle, Coinbase, and the Prohibition on Interest Under the GENIUS Act,” Columbia CLS Blue Sky Blog (Dec. 11, 2025) (reporting $907.9 million in 2024 distribution fees paid by Circle to Coinbase and Coinbase’s advertised 3.85% rewards, and arguing the arrangement is “exactly what Section 4(a)(11) forbids”; reporting that Coinbase’s website states “USDC Rewards is a loyalty program funded by Coinbase”), available at https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2025/12/11/circle-coinbase-and-the-prohibition-on-interest-under-the-genius-act/. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Consumer Federation of America, “CLARITY Act Section 404: Ban on Stablecoin Yield ‘Not Found’” (May 8, 2026) (describing the Circle-Coinbase agreement under which “Coinbase gets half of the profits from the interest Circle’s stablecoin reserves earn”), available at https://consumerfed.org/clarity-act-section-404-ban-on-stablecoin-yield-not-found/. ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Jeff Albus, “Are You Sure Your USDC Rewards Are Safe?,” Unchained (Oct. 22, 2026) (“Coinbase (COIN) pays 3.75% a year to customers who hold USDC … as long as they belong to Coinbase One, its paid membership tier.”), available at https://unchainedcrypto.com/are-you-sure-your-usdc-rewards-are-safe/. ↩ ↩2
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OCC NPRM, “Implementing the Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act for the Issuance of Stablecoins by Entities Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,” 91 Fed. Reg. 10,202 (Mar. 2, 2026); id. at 10,212; comment period closed May 1, 2026. See also Sullivan & Cromwell, “GENIUS Act Implementation: OCC Issues Proposed Rules” (Mar. 11, 2026), available at https://www.sullcrom.com/insights/memo/2026/March/OCC-Proposes-Regulations-Implement-GENIUS-Act. The proposed rule would presume a violation of the interest prohibition where an issuer has an arrangement to pay interest or yield to “an affiliate or a related third party” that in turn pays holders, notes that other arrangements “may also violate” the prohibition, and explains that the OCC cannot enumerate all “arrangements with third parties in which issuers could achieve the payment of yield to payment stablecoin holders.” PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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GENIUS Act § 4(a)(11), Pub. L. No. 119-27 (prohibiting “any form of interest or yield … solely in connection with the holding, use, or retention” of a payment stablecoin paid by the issuer or a foreign payment stablecoin issuer); § 4(a)(4)(A)(i), 139 Stat. 427 (directing “capital requirements applicable to permitted payment stablecoin issuers that—(I) are tailored to the business model and risk profile of permitted payment stablecoin issuers”). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5
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American Bankers Association, Bank Policy Institute, Consumer Bankers Association, Financial Services Forum, Independent Community Bankers of America, and National Bankers Association, Letter to Chairman Tim Scott and Ranking Member Elizabeth Warren on Section 404 of the CLARITY Act (May 8, 2026) (endorsing the activity-versus-interest distinction and urging four amendments, including removal of subsection (3)(B) “in its entirety”), available at https://bpi.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/05/Joint-Trades-Letter-Section-404-of-the-CLARITY-Act-05.08.26.pdf. PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
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Bank Policy Institute, “Closing the Payment of Interest Loophole for Stablecoins” (Aug. 12, 2025) (arguing that without a prohibition reaching exchanges and affiliates the GENIUS Act requirements “can be easily evaded and undermined,” and citing a Treasury estimate of “as much as $6.6 trillion in deposit outflows, depending on whether stablecoins are able to offer interest or yield”), available at https://bpi.com/closing-the-payment-of-interest-loophole-for-stablecoins/. U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee, Charge 2: Digital Money (Apr. 30, 2025) (slides 10 and 12: ”~$6.6tn,” a figure that slide 12’s note 4 says “[r]eflects transactional deposits only,” in an “Illustrative Money Supply Re-Shuffle” that “Potentially generates no net change to the US money supply”; interest-bearing stablecoins are “a hypothetical design feature”), available at https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/221/TBACCharge2Q22025.pdf. PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Council of Economic Advisers (White House), “Effects of Stablecoin Yield Prohibition on Bank Lending” (Apr. 8, 2026), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/research/2026/04/effects-of-stablecoin-yield-prohibition-on-bank-lending/. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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In re BlockFi Lending LLC, Securities Act Release No. 33-11029, Investment Company Act Release No. 34503 (Feb. 14, 2022) (ordering a $50 million civil penalty payable to the SEC; finding, in a settled order, the BlockFi Interest Accounts securities as notes under Reves and as investment contracts under Howey; Securities Act §§ 5(a), 5(c), 17(a)(2), 17(a)(3); Investment Company Act § 7(a)), available at https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2022/33-11029.pdf. See also SEC Press Release No. 2022-26 (Feb. 14, 2022) (“BlockFi agreed to pay an additional $50 million in fines to 32 states to settle similar charges.”), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2022-26. PDF ↩ ↩2
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SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946) (defining an investment contract as “a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party”). PDF ↩
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SEC v. Celsius Network Ltd., No. 1:23-cv-06005 (S.D.N.Y. filed July 13, 2023) (complaint alleging that Celsius offered and sold the Earn Interest Program as securities without a registration statement). See SEC Press Release No. 2023-133 (July 13, 2023), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-133. PDF ↩
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SEC Div. of Corp. Fin., Statement on Stablecoins (Apr. 4, 2025) (Covered Stablecoins are not securities under Howey or Reves; the staff “do not express a view regarding the application of the federal securities laws to ‘yield-bearing stablecoins’”), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/speeches-statements/statement-stablecoins-040425. The statement is a staff statement with no legal force or effect; the Commission adopted its Covered Stablecoin conclusion in 2026. See note 61. ↩ ↩2
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SEC & CFTC, “Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets,” Securities Act Release No. 33-11412, 91 Fed. Reg. 13,714 (Mar. 23, 2026) (final rule; interpretation; guidance); id. at 13,720 (“the Commission interprets that, for the reasons set forth in the Staff Stablecoin Statement, the offer and sale of Covered Stablecoins does not involve the offer and sale of securities”; “The foregoing interpretation does not address stablecoins other than Covered Stablecoins as described in the Staff Stablecoin Statement”; payment stablecoins issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer “categorically will not be securities by operation of statute after the effective date of the GENIUS Act”), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2026/03/23/2026-05635/application-of-the-federal-securities-laws-to-certain-types-of-crypto-assets-and-certain. ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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GENIUS Act § 17 (amending Investment Advisers Act § 202(a)(18), Investment Company Act § 2(a)(36), Securities Act § 2(a)(1), Exchange Act § 3(a)(10), and SIPA § 16(14) so that “[t]he term ‘security’ does not include a payment stablecoin issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer,” and Commodity Exchange Act § 1a(9) likewise for “commodity,” and Investment Company Act § 3(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(3), to exclude a permitted payment stablecoin issuer from the investment-company definition); § 2(22)(B)(iii) (the term “payment stablecoin” does not include a digital asset that is a security under the Securities Act, the Exchange Act, or the Investment Company Act). PDF ↩ ↩2
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Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 64-67 (1990) (presumption that a note is a security, rebutted only by a strong family resemblance, on four factors, to an enumerated category of non-security notes). PDF ↩ ↩2
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GENIUS Act § 4(a)(1)(A) (eligible reserve assets, on at least a 1:1 basis: United States coins and currency and Federal Reserve balances; demand deposits (or other deposits withdrawable on request) and insured shares at an insured depository institution; Treasury bills, notes, or bonds with 93 days or less remaining maturity; overnight repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements; registered government money-market-fund securities; other similarly liquid Federal Government-issued assets the primary regulator approves; and tokenized forms of those assets other than the repurchase and reverse repurchase agreements); § 10(a) (reserve custody only by a person subject to supervision or regulation by a primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator or by the SEC or the CFTC as primary financial regulatory agencies under Dodd-Frank § 2(12)(B)-(C), 12 U.S.C. § 5301(12)(B)-(C), or to supervision by a State bank supervisor or State credit union supervisor). PDF ↩ ↩2
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GENIUS Act § 4(a)(1)(C) (monthly website publication of the composition of reserves), § 4(a)(3) (monthly examination of the reserve report by a registered public accounting firm and monthly CEO and CFO certification), § 4(a)(5) (PPSI treated as a financial institution for Bank Secrecy Act, sanctions, customer identification, and due diligence purposes), § 4(c)(1) (a State qualified issuer with consolidated total outstanding issuance of not more than $10,000,000,000 may opt for a substantially similar State-level regime), § 4(d)(1)-(3) (above that threshold the issuer transitions to the Federal regulatory framework “not later than 360 days after the payment stablecoin reaches such threshold,” unless the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator waives the requirement). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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FinCEN/OFAC Joint NPRM, “Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism Program and Sanctions Compliance Program Requirements,” 91 Fed. Reg. 18,582 (Apr. 10, 2026); id. at 18,613; comment period closed June 9, 2026; the agencies propose that their final rules take effect 12 months after issuance. See also Sullivan & Cromwell, “GENIUS Act Implementation—FinCEN, OFAC Propose Rule on AML and Sanctions-Compliance Requirements” (Apr. 17, 2026), available at https://www.sullcrom.com/insights/memo/2026/April/GENIUS-Act-Implementation-FinCEN-OFAC-Propose-Rule-AML-Sanctions-Compliance-Requirements. PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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Treasury ANPRM, “GENIUS Act Implementation,” 90 Fed. Reg. 45,159 (Sept. 19, 2025) (FR Doc. 2025-18226) (seeking comment on the broad-based principles for determining whether a state-level regime is “substantially similar” to the federal regulatory framework under GENIUS § 4(c), on comparability determinations under § 18(b), and on reciprocal arrangements under § 18(d)). PDF ↩
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Investment Company Act § 3(a)(1)(A), (a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A), (a)(2) (an issuer engaged primarily in investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities; “investment securities” excludes Government securities); § 3(c)(1), (c)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (c)(7) (securities “beneficially owned by not more than one hundred persons”; securities “owned exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are qualified purchasers”). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Securities Act § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (security definition). PDF ↩
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GENIUS Act § 4(e)(3), 139 Stat. 438 (“It shall be unlawful to market a product in the United States as a payment stablecoin unless the product is issued pursuant to this Act.”; “Whoever knowingly and willfully participates in a violation of subparagraph (A) shall be fined by the Department of the Treasury not more than $500,000 for each such violation.”). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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BlackRock USD Institutional Digital Liquidity Fund Ltd., Form D/A (filed July 27, 2026) (claiming the Rule 506(c) and Investment Company Act § 3(c)(7) exemptions; $100,000 minimum investment; no non-accredited investors), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2013810/000201381026000002/primary_doc.xml; assets under management of roughly $2.8 billion as of August 2026 per Shiraz Jagati, “Blackrock’s BUIDL Hits $2.8B, Reclaims Treasury Crown,” Bitcoin.com News (Aug. 31, 2026), available at https://news.bitcoin.com/finance/blackrock-buidl-2-8-billion-tokenized-treasury-crown/, and “Securitize’s BUIDL Regains Title as Largest Tokenized US Treasury Fund,” Crypto Briefing (Aug. 30, 2026), available at https://cryptobriefing.com/buidl-regains-largest-tokenized-treasury-fund/. PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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Franklin Templeton, Franklin OnChain U.S. Government Money Fund (FOBXX; fund number BENJI), fund page (total net assets $720.93 million as of July 31, 2026; a government money-market fund), available at https://www.franklintempleton.com/investments/options/money-market-funds/products/29386/SINGLCLASS/franklin-on-chain-u-s-government-money-fund/FOBXX; Franklin Templeton Trust, Registration Statement on Form N-1A, Post-Effective Amendment No. 11 (Form 485BPOS) (filed July 27, 2026) (File Nos. 333-233596, 811-23471) (the Fund “intends to be a ‘Government money market fund,’ as such term is defined in or interpreted under Rule 2a-7” and “invests at least 99.5% of its total assets in Government securities, cash and repurchase agreements collateralized fully by Government securities or cash”), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1786958/000165558926000970/c485bpos.htm. ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (Rule 2a-7 money-market fund regulation). PDF ↩
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Mountain Protocol USDM wind-down documentation; Anchorage Digital acquisition (wind-down attributed in part to “the evolving U.S. regulatory landscape, including upcoming stablecoin legislation”), available at https://docs.mountainprotocol.com/wind-down-documentation/usdm-wind-down-overview. ↩
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Ondo Finance, USDY product page (tokenized note secured by short-term Treasuries; non-U.S. persons only under Regulation S; tokens not registered under the Securities Act; issuer not registered as an investment company under the Investment Company Act; “USDY is a yieldcoin, but not a stablecoin.”), available at https://ondo.finance/usdy. ↩ ↩2
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Securities Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e; § 2(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (the issue of another security upon exercise of a conversion right issued with a security “shall be deemed a sale of such other security”). PDF PDF ↩
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OCC Interpretive Letter 1170 (July 22, 2020) (crypto-asset custody), available at https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2020/int1170.pdf. PDF ↩ ↩2
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OCC Interpretive Letter 1172 (Sept. 21, 2020) (stablecoin reserves), available at https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2020/int1172.pdf. PDF ↩ ↩2
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OCC Interpretive Letter 1174 (Jan. 4, 2021) (DLT payment / independent node verification), available at https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2021/nr-occ-2021-2a.pdf. PDF ↩ ↩2
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OCC Interpretive Letter 1183 (Mar. 7, 2025) (rescinds IL 1179; reaffirms 1170, 1172, 1174 authorities), available at https://www.occ.gov/topics/charters-and-licensing/interpretations-and-actions/2025/int1183.pdf. PDF ↩ ↩2
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GENIUS Act § 5(h), 12 U.S.C. § 5904(h) (preempting any State charter, license, or other authorization-to-do-business requirement as to a Federal qualified PPSI or an approved subsidiary of an insured depository institution or credit union, while preserving a State’s authority to charter, license, supervise, or regulate its own insured depository institutions and credit unions); § 7(f)(1) (the laws of a host State “shall only apply to the activities conducted in the host State by an out-of-State State qualified payment stablecoin issuer to the same extent as such laws apply to the activities conducted in the host State by an out-of-State Federal qualified payment stablecoin issuer”); § 7(f)(4) (state consumer-protection laws and common-law remedies not preempted); § 17 (excluding a payment stablecoin issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer from the federal definitions of “security” and “commodity”). The Act contains no provision expressly preempting state securities law. PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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FDIC NPRM, “Approval Requirements for Issuance of Payment Stablecoins by Subsidiaries of FDIC-Supervised Insured Depository Institutions,” 90 Fed. Reg. 59,409 (Dec. 19, 2025) (FR Doc. 2025-23510); comment period extended to May 18, 2026, see 91 Fed. Reg. 6,138 (Feb. 11, 2026). PDF PDF ↩
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Treasury NPRM, “GENIUS Act Broad-Based Principles for Determining Whether a State-Level Regulatory Regime Is Substantially Similar to the Federal Regulatory Framework,” 91 Fed. Reg. 16,844 (Apr. 3, 2026); comments closed June 2, 2026. PDF ↩
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Treasury Interim Final Rule, “Forms and Procedures for Review of State Certifications by the Stablecoin Certification Review Committee,” 91 Fed. Reg. 61,688 (Sept. 30, 2026) (“This interim final rule is effective September 30, 2026; however, certifications will not be accepted until after Paperwork Reduction Act approval of the information collection”); comments due Nov. 30, 2026. PDF ↩ ↩2
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Wyoming Stable Token Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 40-31-101 to -110 (2026) (§ 40-31-103(a) creating the Wyoming Stable Token Commission as “a body politic and corporate operating as an instrumentality of the state of Wyoming”; § 40-31-105(c)(i) authorizing it to issue Wyoming stable tokens); Office of the Governor of Wyoming, “Wyoming Launches Pioneering State-Issued Stable Tokens—The Frontier Stable Token Ushers in a New Era of Digital Finance” (Aug. 19, 2025) (announcing the FRNT mainnet launch by the Wyoming Stable Token Commission, “[e]stablished in March 2023 under the Wyoming Stable Token Act,” and describing Wyoming as “the first public entity in the United States to issue a blockchain-based stable token”), available at https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/WYGOV/bulletins/3ee734a. GENIUS § 2(24) defines “person” as “an individual, partnership, company, corporation, association, trust, estate, cooperative organization, or other business entity, incorporated or unincorporated,” and § 3(a) makes it unlawful “for any person other than a permitted payment stablecoin issuer to issue a payment stablecoin in the United States”; the Act carries no express exemption for a State issuing in its own name. PDF PDF ↩ ↩2
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GENIUS Act § 3(b)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5902(b)(1), 139 Stat. 423 (“Except as provided in subsection (c) and section 18, beginning on the date that is 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act, it shall be unlawful for a digital asset service provider to offer or sell a payment stablecoin to a person in the United States, unless the payment stablecoin is issued by a permitted payment stablecoin issuer.”); § 3(c) (Treasury safe harbors). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (Rule 2a-7; the stable-NAV and “money market” name-term mechanics as amended in 2014, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736 (Aug. 14, 2014), and the liquidity-fee provisions as amended in 2023, 88 Fed. Reg. 51,404 (Aug. 3, 2023)). PDF PDF PDF ↩
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GENIUS Act § 16, 12 U.S.C. § 5915, 139 Stat. 461 (2025); § 16(a)(1) (nothing in the Act limits a depository institution’s authority to engage in “accepting or receiving deposits or shares (in the case of a credit union), and issuing digital assets that represent those deposits or shares”); § 16(c) (“The appropriate Federal banking agency, the National Credit Union Administration (in the case of a credit union), and the Securities and Exchange Commission may not require a depository institution, national bank, Federal credit union, State credit union, or trust company, or any affiliate thereof—(1) to include digital assets held in custody that are not owned by the entity as a liability on the financial statement or balance sheet of the entity, including payment stablecoin custody or safekeeping activities; or (2) to hold in custody or safekeeping regulatory capital against digital assets and reserves backing such assets described in section 4(a)(1)(A), except as necessary to mitigate against operational risks inherent in custody or safekeeping services, as determined by” the appropriate Federal banking agency, the NCUA, a State bank supervisor, or a State credit union supervisor). PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4 ↩5 ↩6
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SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 121 (Mar. 31, 2022; effective Apr. 11, 2022) (rescinded by SAB 122), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/staff-guidance/staff-accounting-bulletins/staff-accounting-bulletin-121. ↩
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SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 122 (Jan. 23, 2025; effective Jan. 30, 2025) (rescinding the staff’s SAB 121 interpretive guidance (Topic 5.FF) on safeguarding liabilities for crypto-assets held for platform users; entities instead apply ASC Subtopic 450-20 or IAS 37 to determine “whether to recognize a liability related to the risk of loss”), available at https://www.sec.gov/rules-regulations/staff-guidance/staff-accounting-bulletins/staff-accounting-bulletin-122. See Deloitte Heads Up, “SAB 121 and Done: SEC Issues SAB 122 to Rescind Guidance on Safeguarding Crypto Assets,” Vol. 32, Issue 1 (Jan. 27, 2025), available at https://dart.deloitte.com/USDART/home/publications/deloitte/heads-up/2025/sec-rescinds-sab-121-issues-sab-122-crypto-cryptocurrency. ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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H.R. 3633 § 310 (as passed by the House) (treatment of custody activities by banking institutions) (barring the appropriate Federal banking agency, the NCUA, and the SEC from requiring a listed entity to carry custodied assets “that are not accounted for as assets of the entity” as a balance-sheet liability, or to hold regulatory capital against custodied assets, including reserves backing such assets, “except as necessary to mitigate against operational risks inherent with the custody or safekeeping services,” as determined by those three regulators or a State bank or credit union supervisor). The Senate Banking reported substitute deletes House § 310 (“<DELETED>SEC. 310. TREATMENT OF CUSTODY ACTIVITIES BY BANKING INSTITUTIONS.</DELETED>”); its own § 310 is a GAO study on intermediaries in foreign jurisdictions. PDF ↩ ↩2
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GENIUS Act § 2(25)(A), 12 U.S.C. § 5901(25)(A), 139 Stat. 422 (the primary Federal payment stablecoin regulator “with respect to a subsidiary of an insured depository institution (other than an insured credit union)” is “the appropriate Federal banking agency of such insured depository institution”). PDF ↩
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H.R. 3633 § 308 (as passed by the House) (amending Securities Act § 18(b) to provide that “[a] digital commodity shall be treated as a covered security”; § 308(b) rule of construction preserving the existing authority of State securities commissions under Securities Act § 18(c)(1)). PDF PDF ↩
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Letter of Thirty-two State Securities Regulators to Sens. Scott and Warren on the CLARITY Act and the DCIA (Mar. 12, 2026; one signatory joined Apr. 28, 2026) (urging preservation of state authority consistent with NSMIA and a catch-all savings clause for state anti-fraud enforcement) (attaching NASAA letter of Feb. 23, 2026), available at https://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Thirty-one-State-Regulators-Urge-Congress-to-Preserve-their-Role-as-Fraud-Fighters-in-the-Federal-Market-Structure-Proposals-3.12.26-F.pdf. PDF ↩
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Truth in Savings Act, Regulation DD, 12 C.F.R. § 1030.2(a) (defining “account” as “a deposit account at a depository institution that is held by or offered to a consumer”), (f) (bonus), (n) (interest); § 1030.4 (account-opening disclosures, including the annual percentage yield); § 1030.5(a)(1) (advance notice of a change in terms that may reduce the annual percentage yield or adversely affect the consumer); § 1030.6 (periodic statement disclosures), available at https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-12/chapter-X/part-1030. ↩ ↩2 ↩3 ↩4
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California Digital Financial Assets Law, Cal. Fin. Code §§ 3101 et seq. (added by Stats. 2023, Ch. 792 (AB 39), eff. Jan. 1, 2024); § 3201 (on or after July 1, 2026, licensure under § 3203, a completed application submitted on or before July 1, 2026 and awaiting decision, or a § 3103 exemption required to engage in digital financial asset business activity with or on behalf of a resident; as amended by Stats. 2026, Ch. 52 (SB 97)); § 3102(h)(1) (defining the activity to include exchanging, transferring, or storing a digital financial asset; as amended by Stats. 2026, Ch. 52 (SB 97)); AB 1934, Stats. 2024, Ch. 945 (extending the deadline to July 1, 2026). PDF PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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NCUA Supplemental NPRM, 91 Fed. Reg. 28,956 (May 18, 2026); FDIC NPRM, “Bank Secrecy Act and Sanctions Compliance Standards for FDIC-Supervised Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuers,” 91 Fed. Reg. 34,171 (June 5, 2026); FinCEN, OCC, Federal Reserve Board, FDIC, and NCUA Joint NPRM, “Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Customer Identification Program,” 91 Fed. Reg. 37,234 (June 22, 2026); OCC NPRM, “Permitted Payment Stablecoin Issuer Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the Financing of Terrorism and Sanctions Compliance Risk Management,” 91 Fed. Reg. 37,840 (June 24, 2026); Treasury NPRM, “GENIUS Act Regulations on Payment Stablecoin Issuance, Offer, and Sale,” 91 Fed. Reg. 53,368 (Aug. 18, 2026) (implementing § 3, including a digital asset service provider’s reliance on a foreign payment stablecoin issuer’s compliance with lawful orders and any reciprocal arrangement under § 18); comments due Oct. 19, 2026. PDF PDF PDF PDF PDF ↩ ↩2 ↩3
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New York Department of Financial Services, Industry Letter, Guidance on the Issuance of U.S. Dollar-Backed Stablecoins (June 8, 2022) (reserve, redemption, and attestation requirements for U.S. dollar-backed stablecoins issued under DFS supervision by DFS-regulated virtual currency entities; predating GENIUS), available at https://www.dfs.ny.gov/industry_guidance/industry_letters/il20220608_issuance_stablecoins. ↩
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Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCA), arts. 40 and 50 (asset-referenced tokens and e-money tokens respectively; paragraph 1 of each bars issuers, and paragraph 2 crypto-asset service providers, from granting interest, and paragraph 3 treats any remuneration or other benefit related to the length of time a holder holds the token as interest); Titles III and IV applicable from June 30, 2024 (art. 149(3)). PDF ↩
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SEC Press Release No. 2023-133 (July 13, 2023) (Celsius “has consented to the relief requested in the complaint, which includes a permanent injunction against future securities law violations”), available at https://www.sec.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2023-133; Complaint ¶ 15 & Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 5-6, SEC v. Celsius Network Ltd., No. 1:23-cv-06005 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2023) (seeking civil penalties and disgorgement against Mashinsky). PDF ↩