When the SEC Won't Act: Private Litigation Options for Crypto Investors

In 2025, the SEC walked away from crypto enforcement. The Commission dismissed its cases against Coinbase and Binance by joint stipulation, the Binance dismissal with prejudice.¹ Enforcement actions fell sixty percent, from thirty-three in 2024 to thirteen in 2025, and monetary penalties fell to $142 million, less than three percent of the total imposed in 2024.² The agency replaced its crypto enforcement unit with a broader Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit of approximately thirty fraud specialists and attorneys.³

If you lost money on a token offering, a collapsed exchange, or a DeFi protocol that promised what it couldn’t deliver—this might feel like the door just closed. It didn’t. It shifted. The SEC’s retreat is a policy choice, not a legal change. No statute was repealed. No court overruled the Howey test. The GENIUS Act covers stablecoins only; broader market structure legislation remains stalled in the Senate. The law that made your token a security last year still makes it a security today.

Private litigation is now the primary accountability mechanism in crypto. In the first half of 2025 alone, crypto securities class action filings nearly matched the entire 2024 total.⁴ Settlements are proving viability: Silvergate paid $37.5 million; the BlockFi securities settlement $13.25 million; DraftKings $10 million; and the settlement with Shaquille O’Neal’s Astrals NFT project created a fund of up to $11 million.⁵ Courts are certifying classes, granting discovery, and letting cases proceed. This article maps the legal toolkit available to crypto investors when the regulator won’t act—and explains why the window for some claims is closing now.

Key Takeaways

• The SEC’s retreat is a policy choice, not a legal change—Howey still applies, no statute has been repealed, and the SEC’s March 2026 interpretive release with the CFTC calls it binding legal precedent.
• Section 12(a)(1) is the strongest tool for investors—strict liability, rescission remedy, no fraud proof needed, and at least one court has certified a Section 12(a)(1) class.
• Who passed title matters—an exchange is a statutory seller of what it sells from its own inventory, not of trades it merely matches; decentralized protocol developers generally are not sellers at all.
• California state claims are underappreciated—Corporations Code sections 25501 and 25503 require no scienter or reliance and now carry mandatory attorney fees.
• Statutes of limitations are running now—Section 12(a)(1) runs one year from the violation and three years from the date the security was first bona fide offered to the public, not from discovery. Claims on tokens first offered in 2022 have already reposed.

What Does the SEC’s Crypto Retreat Actually Mean?

The SEC has stopped enforcing crypto securities laws, but the legal framework that makes tokens securities remains fully intact. What changed is the enforcer, not the law.

The retreat is structural, not just statistical. For the policy arc behind the dismissals, see The SEC’s Crypto Pivot. The SEC replaced its Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit with the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit, a group of approximately thirty fraud specialists and attorneys whose remit runs from AI-enabled fraud to brokerage-account takeovers.⁶ It dismissed its case against Coinbase by joint stipulation, and dismissed the Binance case with prejudice—meaning the agency cannot refile those claims.⁷ It dropped its appeal in Ripple.⁸ Commissioner Crenshaw, dissenting, described the approach as a “programmatic disassembly of the SEC’s crypto enforcement program.”⁹

The decline is accelerating. The SEC brought thirty-three crypto enforcement actions in 2024 and thirteen in 2025, five of the thirteen filed under Chair Gensler before his January departure.¹⁰ Monetary penalties fell to $142 million, less than three percent of the total imposed in 2024.²

None of this changes the underlying law. The Howey test—which asks whether a transaction involves “an investment of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of others”—remains binding Supreme Court precedent.¹¹ That framework determines whether a digital asset is a security, and no court has disturbed it. Congress has not repealed any provision of the Securities Act or Exchange Act. The GENIUS Act, signed in July 2025, addresses stablecoins only.¹² The CLARITY Act, which would establish a broader market structure framework, passed the House but stalled in the Senate.¹³ And the SEC’s own March 2026 interpretive release, issued jointly with the CFTC, states that its interpretation does not supersede or replace the Howey test, “which is binding legal precedent.”¹⁴

If you bought tokens in an offering that was never registered—the legal violation hasn’t disappeared because the SEC stopped enforcing it.

What Private Claims Can Crypto Investors Bring?

Crypto investors can bring federal securities claims under Section 12(a)(1) and Rule 10b-5, California state securities and UCL claims, and common law actions for breach of contract and fraud. But which claims are available—and against whom—depends on a distinction that two recent federal court decisions have sharpened: whether the defendant operates a centralized platform or a decentralized protocol.

The Centralized vs. Decentralized Framework

In February 2025, the Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of federal securities claims against Uniswap’s developers in Risley v. Universal Navigation, holding that deploying autonomous smart contract code does not make a developer a statutory seller. On the Exchange Act claim, and agreeing with the district court, the panel said it “defies logic” that a drafter of a smart contract “could be held liable under the Exchange Act for a third-party user’s misuse of the platform.”¹⁵ The decision was issued as a summary order—persuasive but not binding precedent in the Second Circuit.

Three weeks earlier, Judge Engelmayer in the Southern District of New York reached a different conclusion for centralized exchanges. In Underwood v. Coinbase, the court, “[s]ubstantially constrained by the Second Circuit’s decision,” denied Coinbase judgment on the pleadings, holding the amended complaint well-pled Coinbase as a direct seller under the first prong of the Supreme Court’s test in Pinter v. Dahl—title and privity—without reaching Pinter’s solicitation prong. On summary judgment in July 2026, the same court held Coinbase was not a statutory seller as to the matched trades that made up roughly 99.97% of its volume in the tokens at issue, but was a statutory seller as to the 0.03% it filled from its own inventory.¹⁶

The framework is narrower than a centralized-versus-decentralized label suggests. Centralized intermediaries—exchanges, token issuers, promoters, and entities that actively facilitate sales—face direct exposure, though Underwood shows the exposure turns on whether the intermediary passed title rather than on how centralized it is. Developers of truly autonomous, open-source protocols generally do not. And where governance participants actively manage a nominally decentralized project, courts are looking through the label: in Samuels v. Lido DAO, the Northern District of California held that a DAO could be treated as a general partnership, exposing governance participants—including venture capital firms like a16z and Paradigm—to personal liability. As the court put it: “Lido’s alleged actions are not those of an autonomous software program—they are the actions of an entity run by people.”¹⁷

With that framework in place, here are the primary causes of action.

Section 12(a)(1): Unregistered Securities Sale

This is the strongest tool in the toolkit. Section 12(a)(1) of the Securities Act imposes strict liability on anyone who “offers or sells a security” without registration—no fraud, no scienter, no reliance required.¹⁸ Under the Supreme Court’s Pinter v. Dahl framework, “seller” status reaches only two categories: the owner who “passed title, or other interest in the security, to the buyer for value,” and the person who “successfully solicit[ed] the purchase, motivated at least in part by a desire to serve his own financial interests or those of the securities owner.”¹⁸ Pinter refused to extend liability to “participants collateral to the offer or sale,” and it reaches only the buyer’s immediate seller—a buyer “cannot recover against his seller’s seller.” The remedy is rescission: on tender of the security, the buyer recovers the consideration paid with interest, less any income received, or damages if the buyer no longer holds it. The seller’s state of mind about the violation is irrelevant, though the solicitation prong carries its own motive element. The questions are whether the asset is a security, whether the sale violated Section 5’s registration requirement, whether the defendant sold it, and whether the defendant sold it to you.

Courts are certifying classes on this theory. In March 2025, the Middle District of Florida certified a class in the LGBCoin case on Section 12(a)(1) claims, and later denied reconsideration and a stay.¹⁹ The EthereumMax litigation marks the limit: in August 2025 the Central District of California certified four state consumer-protection classes but denied certification of the nationwide class brought under the California and Florida securities laws.²⁰

The critical limitation is the statute of limitations. Section 12(a)(1) carries a one-year limitations period running from the violation—for an unregistered sale, the sale itself—and a three-year statute of repose running from the date the security was “bona fide offered to the public,” not from the date you discovered the problem.²¹ Courts apply a first-offered rule, so for tokens first offered during the 2021-2022 boom the three-year repose window has largely closed.

Federal Securities Fraud: Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5

Where the defendant made affirmative misrepresentations—not just sold an unregistered token—Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 provide a fraud-based cause of action. The elements are more demanding: a material misrepresentation or omission, scienter, a connection with the purchase or sale of a security, reliance, economic loss, and loss causation.²² The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act imposes heightened pleading requirements, and the Supreme Court’s Tellabs standard requires that the inference of scienter be at least as compelling as any opposing inference.²³

The tradeoff is a longer limitations window: two years from discovery of the violation, with a five-year statute of repose.²⁴ Use this claim when the facts support fraud—misleading whitepapers, fabricated partnerships, undisclosed insider selling—not just failure to register.

California State Securities Claims

For transactions with a California nexus, state securities law offers significant advantages. Corporations Code section 25501 creates a private right of action for fraud in securities transactions without requiring scienter—the burden shifts to the defendant to prove reasonable care.²⁵ Section 25503 imposes strict liability for unregistered sales, paralleling federal Section 12(a)(1), but its limitations period is short: an action must be brought before the expiration of two years after the violation or one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation, whichever first expires.²⁶

Since 2022, both sections carry mandatory attorney fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs.²⁷ And unlike federal claims, California state securities actions are not subject to the PSLRA’s heightened pleading requirements. Courts are applying these provisions to crypto: in Cress v. Nexo, the Northern District of California allowed a Section 25503 unregistered-securities claim against a crypto lending platform to proceed as to the platform’s own token, holding that federal preemption could not be inferred from the face of the complaint.²⁸

California UCL (Business and Professions Code Section 17200)

The Unfair Competition Law is the broadest tool in the California toolkit. Its unlawful prong borrows any underlying securities violation; its unfair and fraudulent prongs operate independently.²⁹ Under the fraud prong the named plaintiff must show actual reliance, but absent class members need not, and where the practice is an extended campaign the representative need not tie reliance to particular statements—which is what makes class treatment workable.³⁰ Its four-year limitations period, running from accrual, is the longest securities-claim limitations period surveyed here.³¹

The limitations are real: remedies are restricted to restitution and injunction, with no compensatory damages available.³² But the UCL’s value is strategic. In Kramer v. Coinbase, the California Court of Appeal held that a UCL complaint seeking only public injunctive relief, and no private relief, is not subject to arbitration—meaning the UCL can keep cases in court when other claims get pushed to arbitration.³³

Common Law Claims

Breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and common law fraud round out the toolkit. Contract claims turn on the enforceability of token purchase agreements and platform terms of service—the distinction between clickwrap and browsewrap agreements often determines the outcome. Fiduciary duty claims exist where a platform promises asset segregation, as in the Bhatia litigation against Silvergate’s bank defendants, but not where terms of service transfer ownership of deposited assets to the platform, as the bankruptcy court found in the Celsius bankruptcy.³⁴ Common law fraud is flexible—no securities classification required—but demands individual proof of reliance, making class treatment difficult.

Which Claim Fits Your Situation?

The right claim depends on what happened, not just how much you lost. Start with the facts.

Why Are Private Crypto Suits Succeeding Now?

The SEC enforcement vacuum, clarified case law, successful class certifications, cracking arbitration defenses, and growing litigation funding are converging to make 2026 the most favorable environment for private crypto suits since digital assets entered the securities landscape.

The enforcement vacuum is the most obvious factor. When the SEC was actively pursuing crypto cases, defendants could argue—and courts could reason—that the government was already addressing the harm. That argument is gone. Oregon’s Attorney General made the point explicitly, filing a state securities action against Coinbase in April 2025, weeks after the SEC dismissed its own case.³⁵

The doctrinal landscape has also clarified. The centralized-versus-decentralized framework described above gives plaintiffs a roadmap for identifying viable defendants. Firms that previously hesitated on crypto cases now have the legal footing to proceed.

Class certification is succeeding. The LGBCoin ruling discussed in the previous section demonstrates that Section 12(a)(1) claims are certifiable—and class certification transforms the economics. A claim that is not worth pursuing individually becomes viable when aggregated across thousands of purchasers.

Arbitration—the biggest practical obstacle in crypto litigation—is cracking. In Anderson v. Zhao, the Southern District of New York refused in February 2026 to compel arbitration of claims that accrued before Binance imposed its arbitration clause, holding both that users got no adequate notice of the terms change and that the new clause could not reach claims that had already accrued.³⁶ In Young v. Solana Labs, an unpublished Ninth Circuit memorandum affirmed the denial of a token issuer’s motion to compel arbitration, holding equitable estoppel inapplicable because the investor’s statutory claims “depend[ed] upon statutory requirements rather than contractual obligations” and never invoked the third-party platform’s terms of use the issuer had not signed.³⁷ These decisions don’t eliminate arbitration as a defense, but they narrow the pathways available to defendants.

Settlements are validating the model. The Silvergate, BlockFi, DraftKings, and Astrals recoveries demonstrate that private crypto securities cases produce real money for investors—not just headlines. And the litigation funding market is expanding the plaintiff-side capacity to bring these cases: third-party litigation funding investments were estimated to reach $18.9 billion in 2025 and are projected to exceed $67 billion annually by 2037.³⁸

The sophistication of claims is escalating. The Pump.fun RICO action against Baton Corporation and its founders—where plaintiffs “estimate that retail traders collectively lost between $4 billion and $5.5 billion trading Pump.fun tokens,” and where a confidential informant produced nearly 5,000 internal chat logs—represents a new tier of private crypto enforcement.³⁹ Whether that case succeeds on its theory or not, it signals that the private bar is investing serious resources in crypto claims.

The legal infrastructure for private crypto litigation is more developed than most investors realize. The question is when you file, not whether you can.

What Should Crypto Investors Do Right Now?

Preserve evidence, check statutes of limitations, calculate losses, identify defendants, and consult securities litigation counsel. The order matters—evidence preservation comes first because everything else depends on having the record.

Understand Your Deadlines

Statutes of limitations are the single biggest risk to otherwise valid claims. The windows vary by cause of action, and some are already closing:

The critical deadline: Section 12(a)(1)‘s three-year repose runs from the date the security was bona fide offered to the public—not from your purchase, and not from discovery. For tokens first offered in 2022 and early 2023, that window is closing now or has closed. No tolling doctrine extends the three-year repose. If you are considering a claim based on an unregistered sale, this deadline should drive your timeline.

Preserve Your Evidence

Blockchain transactions are permanent, but the evidence that matters most in securities litigation is often off-chain: marketing materials, whitepaper promises, Discord and Telegram messages, email communications, platform terms of service at the time of purchase, and account statements showing deposits and withdrawals. Platforms shut down. Servers go offline. Screenshots and archived web pages taken today may be the only record available at trial.

Calculate Your Losses

Document your purchase price, the date of each transaction, any partial recovery or withdrawal, and the current value of your holdings. For Section 12(a)(1) rescission claims, the measure is the consideration paid with interest, less any income received, on tender of the security—or, if you no longer hold it, damages. For fraud claims, loss causation requires connecting the decline in value to the specific misrepresentation—not just general market movement.

Identify Your Defendants

Who sold the token? Who made the representations you relied on? Where are they located? The centralized-versus-decentralized framework from Risley and Underwood narrows the field, but Underwood’s 2026 summary-judgment ruling narrows it again: what mattered was not that Coinbase was centralized, but whether it passed title from its own inventory or merely matched two users’ orders. Centralized exchanges, token issuers, project foundations, celebrity promoters, and active DAO governance participants are all potential defendants. Anonymous developers of fully decentralized protocols generally are not.

Consult Litigation Counsel

Securities litigation is specialized. The attorney you need is not the one who helped you set up your LLC or reviewed your token purchase agreement. Look for counsel with experience in federal securities class actions, familiarity with the crypto-specific case law, and the resources to litigate against well-funded defendants. Plaintiff-side securities firms typically work on contingency, meaning no upfront cost to the investor.

Evidence preservation is the single highest-ROI action you can take right now. Everything else depends on having the record.

Looking Ahead

The SEC’s retreat from crypto enforcement is not permanent. Administrations change. Commissioners rotate. The pendulum will swing back. But the investors who lost money in 2021, 2022, and 2023 cannot wait for a future enforcement regime to vindicate their claims. Statutes of limitations do not pause for policy cycles.

Private litigation fills the vacuum that regulators leave. The tools exist—Section 12(a)(1) for unregistered sales, 10b-5 for fraud, California state claims for transactions with a West Coast nexus, and the UCL for the broadest reach. The courts are receptive: classes are being certified, arbitration defenses are narrowing, and settlements are delivering real recoveries. The legal infrastructure is more developed than at any point in crypto’s history.

The window is open. For the oldest claims, it is closing. Complex crypto disputes require counsel who understands both the technology and the courtroom. The analysis starts with the facts.

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Disclaimer: This article provides general information for educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Securities litigation is complex and fact-specific. Consult qualified legal counsel for advice on your specific situation.

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Footnotes

1. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Announces Dismissal of Civil Enforcement Action Against Coinbase, No. 2025-47 (Feb. 27, 2025); SEC v. Binance Holdings Ltd., No. 1:23-cv-01599 (D.D.C.), Litigation Release No. 26316 (May 29, 2025) (dismissal with prejudice). ↩

2. Cornerstone Research, “SEC Cryptocurrency Enforcement: 2025 Update” (2025). ↩ ↩²

3. Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release 2025-42 (Feb. 20, 2025) (announcing the Cyber and Emerging Technologies Unit, which “replaces the Crypto Assets and Cyber Unit and is comprised of approximately 30 fraud specialists and attorneys”). ↩

4. Cornerstone Research, “Securities Class Action Filings: 2025 Midyear Assessment” (2025) (six crypto class actions filed in H1 2025; seven total in all of 2024). ↩

5. Cohen Milstein, Press Release, “Court Approves $37.5M Cash Settlement With Silvergate Capital Corporation in Securities Fraud Class Action” (Sept. 3, 2025) (In re Silvergate Capital Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 3:22-cv-01936-JES-MSB (S.D. Cal.)); In re BlockFi, Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 2:23-cv-01165 (D.N.J. Dec. 5, 2025) (final approval of $13,250,000 class settlement); Harper v. O’Neal, No. 1:23-cv-21912-FAM (S.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2025) (order approving class-action settlement creating a fund of up to $11,000,000); Dufoe v. DraftKings Inc., No. 1:23-cv-10524-DJC (D. Mass. July 30, 2025) (order and final judgment approving $10,000,000 class settlement). ↩

6. Securities and Exchange Commission, Press Release 2025-42 (Feb. 20, 2025). ↩

7. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Announces Dismissal of Civil Enforcement Action Against Coinbase, No. 2025-47 (Feb. 27, 2025); SEC v. Binance Holdings Ltd., No. 1:23-cv-01599 (D.D.C.), Litigation Release No. 26316 (May 29, 2025) (dismissal with prejudice). ↩

8. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC v. Ripple Labs, Inc., Litigation Release LR-26369 (Aug. 7, 2025). ↩

9. Commissioner Caroline A. Crenshaw, dissenting statement on crypto enforcement policy (2025). ↩

10. Cornerstone Research, “SEC Cryptocurrency Enforcement: 2025 Update” (2025). ↩

11. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). ↩

12. Guiding and Establishing National Innovation for U.S. Stablecoins Act (GENIUS Act), Pub. L. No. 119-27, 139 Stat. 419 (2025). ↩

13. Digital Asset Market Clarity Act of 2025, H.R. 3633, 119th Cong. (2025) (passed House July 17, 2025; received in Senate and referred to the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Sept. 18, 2025). ↩

14. Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Application of the Federal Securities Laws to Certain Types of Crypto Assets and Certain Transactions Involving Crypto Assets, Release Nos. 33-11412, 34-105020, 91 Fed. Reg. 13714 (Mar. 17, 2026) (SEC interpretation; CFTC guidance). ↩

15. Risley v. Universal Navigation Inc., No. 23-1340-cv, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 4460 (2d Cir. Feb. 26, 2025) (summary order) (quoting Risley v. Universal Navigation Inc., 690 F. Supp. 3d 195, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)). ↩

16. Underwood v. Coinbase Glob., Inc., No. 21 Civ. 8353 (PAE), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22037 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2025) (denying motion for judgment on the pleadings), summary judgment granted in part and denied in part, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168997 (S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2026). ↩

17. Samuels v. Lido DAO, 757 F. Supp. 3d 951, 960 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (denying all motions to dismiss except Robot Ventures’); Samuels v. Lido DAO, No. 23-cv-06492-VC, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 174066 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 2025) (denying motion to compel arbitration as waived). ↩

18. Securities Act of 1933 § 12(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(1); Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 642, 644 n.21, 647, 650 (1988). ↩ ↩²

19. De Ford v. Koutoulas, 348 F.R.D. 724, 743-44 (M.D. Fla. 2025) (certifying class on Section 12(a)(1) claims), reconsideration and stay denied, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66460 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2025). ↩

20. In re EthereumMax Inv. Litig., No. CV 22-00163-MWF (SKx), 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159470 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 6, 2025) (certifying California, New York, Florida, and New Jersey consumer-protection classes; denying certification of the nationwide class brought under the California and Florida securities laws). ↩

21. Securities Act Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m. ↩

22. Securities Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5; Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). ↩

23. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 314, 324 (2007). ↩

24. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b). ↩

25. Cal. Corp. Code § 25501; see Moss v. Kroner, 197 Cal. App. 4th 860, 873 (2011) (quoting § 25501’s proviso that liability attaches unless the defendant proves that the defendant “exercised reasonable care and did not know” of the untruth or omission). ↩

26. Cal. Corp. Code § 25503; Cal. Corp. Code § 25507(a) (limitations). ↩

27. Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25501, 25503 (as amended by Assemb. B. 511, 2021-2022 Reg. Sess., ch. 617 (Cal. 2021), effective Jan. 1, 2022). ↩

28. Cress v. Nexo Financial LLC, No. 3:23-cv-00882-TSH (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2024) (order granting in part and denying in part motion to dismiss first amended complaint) (denying dismissal of the Cal. Corp. Code §§ 25110, 25503 claim as to the NEXO Token). ↩

29. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200. ↩

30. In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298 (2009). ↩

31. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17208. ↩

32. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal. 4th 1134 (2003). ↩

33. See Kramer v. Coinbase, Inc., 105 Cal. App. 5th 741 (2024), cert. denied, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 3403 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2025). ↩

34. See Bhatia v. Silvergate Bank, No. 3:23-cv-01406-RBM-BLM (S.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2024) (order denying motion to dismiss) (FTX’s terms of service promising segregation supported a fiduciary duty; the bank defendants were sued for aiding and abetting its breach); In re Celsius Network LLC, 647 B.R. 631, 636-37 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (Terms of Use transferred title to Earn Account deposits to the platform; assets are property of the estate), appeal dismissed, No. 23-CV-1302 (JPO), 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52086 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2023) (Earn Decision not a final order and leave for interlocutory appeal denied; same order entered in Nos. 23-CV-523 and 23-CV-1243). ↩

35. Oregon Department of Justice, State v. Coinbase Global, Inc. (filed Apr. 2025). ↩

36. Anderson v. Zhao, No. 20-cv-02803 (ALC), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39981 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2026) (denying motion to compel arbitration of claims accruing before the arbitration clause was imposed, for want of notice of the terms modification and because the clause did not apply retroactively). ↩

37. Young v. Solana Labs, Inc., No. 24-6032, 2025 U.S. App. LEXIS 27194 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2025) (unpublished memorandum; not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3) (affirming denial of Solana Labs’s motion to compel arbitration; equitable estoppel unavailable where the plaintiff’s statutory claims did not depend on or invoke Exodus’s Terms of Use), mandate ordered issued, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 1611 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026). ↩

38. Erica B. Zolner, Casey R. Fronk & Emma D. Hall, Beneath the Surface: A Deeper Dive Into Third-Party Litigation Funding, Washington Legal Foundation (Aug. 2025), https://www.wlf.org/2025/08/22/publishing/third-party-litigation-funding/ (litigation funding investments “estimated to reach $18.9 billion in 2025 and to exceed $67 billion annually by 2037,” citing Research Nester, Global Litigation Funding Investment Market Size, Forecast, and Trend Highlights Over 2025-2037). ↩

39. Aguilar v. Baton Corp., No. 25-cv-880 (CM), 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 196239 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2026) (sustaining two plaintiffs’ substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy claims against Baton Corporation and its co-founders, dismissing those claims as to plaintiff Aguilar and as to the Solana defendants, and dismissing the Securities Act counts); Aguilar v. Baton Corp., 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 254331 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2025) (granting leave to amend after a confidential informant produced nearly 5,000 internal chat logs). ↩